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Climate change was for a long time the domain of natural science research. While a 
small group of economists was working on the issue early on as well (Nordhaus, 1991; 
Cline, 1992; Fankhauser, 1995; Tol, 1995; Pearce et al., 1996), the focus of policy 
makers and the controversies surrounding climate change research focused on the basic 
physical science question for a long time. Through a series of reports from the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Houghton et al., 1990; Houghton et al., 
1995; Houghton et al., 2001; Solomon et al., 2007), many of these controversies have 
been settled. The basic scientific questions of whether humans cause climate change and 
whether climate change will intensify in the future due to human greenhouse gas 
emission were answered affirmatively in those reports, and these results are widely 
accepted today. 
Such agreement is mostly missing though on the question how a response to climate 
change should look like. Should one try to slow global warming by putting resources 
into mitigating greenhouse gas emissions? Or should one put resources into adapting to 
the expected impacts of climate change? Reductions of emissions are a global public 
good, which immediately brings up the question how it can be provided and who should 
provide how much of it. Climate change is characterized by an extremely slow causal 
connection: Emissions today will mostly affect people that are not yet alive and any 
2 
costs to mitigate emission reductions today will be borne by people that will most likely 
not be alive anymore when the benefits of those emission reductions occur, which leads 
to difficult questions of how the interests of different generations are to be weighed 
against each other. Finally, one of the key characteristics of climate change policy is 
that one has to come up now with policies that are meant to solve problems whose 
precise magnitude is inherently uncertain, simply because they are based on predictions 
of what is going to happen many decades from now. How should such potentially large 
catastrophic, but nevertheless highly unlikely, events be considered when designing 
climate change policy? 
All of the above are questions that are outside the traditional physical sciences whose 
results started the initial urge to act against climate change. The need for other 
disciplines, and economics in particular, to work on climate change research was 
recognized in expert circles for a long while, but found its most prominent public 
expression in the publication of the Stern Review in 2006 (Stern, 2007). In this thesis I 
try to contribute to the economic research on climate change, by both applying existing 
economic theory to specific issues thought to be of importance in relation to climate 
change, as well as in clarifying on what theoretical basis one might tackle specific 
questions that are posed by climate change. 
In the remainder of this introduction I will give a brief outline of the chapters of this 
thesis and locate their role in the economic climate change research agenda. 
1. Overview 
A useful first starting point for a discussion of the economics of climate change is an 
estimate of the total damage to be expected from climate change impacts. The Stern 
Review (Stern, 2007) published one such impact estimate, but used a different metric 
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than all other previous economic impact studies, making it difficult to compare the 
results from the Stern Review with the existing literature. The Stern Review expressed 
impacts as changes in balanced growth equivalents (BGE), whereas previous studies 
had used either net present total impact estimates or marginal damage cost estimates. In 
chapter 1 we first propose rigorous definitions of the BGE for multiple regions and 
under uncertainty, which was missing from the Stern Review itself. We show that the 
change in the BGE is independent of the assumed scenario of per capita income. For 
comparable welfare economic assumptions as the Stern Review, we calculate lower 
changes in BGE between a business as usual scenario and one without climate impacts 
with the model FUND than the Stern Review found with the model PAGE. We find that 
mitigation policies give even lower changes in BGE and argue that those policy choices 
should be the focus of the research effort rather than total damage estimates. According 
to our results, the current carbon tax should be below $55/tC. Sensitivity analyses show 
that the Stern Review chose parameters that imply high impact estimates. However, for 
regionally disaggregated welfare functions, we find changes in BGE that are 
significantly higher than the results from the Stern Review, both for total damage and 
for policy analysis. With regional disaggregation and high risk aversion, we observe fat 
tails and with that very high welfare losses. 
Most studies of the total impact of climate change are based on an enumerative 
approach, where primary impact estimates are calculated for different sectors of the 
economy and then added up later to derive a total impact estimate. In chapter 2 we 
contribute to the estimation of one particular impact sector, namely impacts from rising 
sea-levels. Using the FUND model, we conduct an impact assessment over the 21
st
 
century for rises in sea-level of up to 2m/century and a range of national socio-
economic scenarios. The model balances the costs of retreat with the costs of protection, 
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including the effects of coastal squeeze. While the costs of sea-level rise increase due to 
greater damage and protection costs, the model suggests that an optimum response in a 
benefit-cost sense remains widespread protection of developed coastal areas. The socio-
economic scenarios are also important in terms of influencing these costs. In terms of 
the four components of costs considered in FUND, protection seems to dominate, with 
substantial costs from wetland loss under some scenarios. The regional distribution of 
costs shows that a few regions experience most of the costs, especially East Asia, North 
America, Europe and South Asia. Importantly, this analysis suggests that protection is 
much more likely and rational than is widely assumed, even with a large rise in sea 
level. However, there are some important limitations to the analysis, which collectively 
suggest that protection may not be as widespread as suggested in the FUND analysis. 
Equity weighting allows the damages to be modified to reflect the wealth of those 
impacted by sea-level rise. Taking these distributional issues into account increases 
damage estimates by a factor of three, reflecting that the costs fall disproportionately on 
poorer developing countries. 
Chapter 3 presents a systematic sensitivity analysis of the social cost of carbon with 
respect to two crucial parameters: the pure rate of time preference and the curvature 
parameter of the utility function, which plays the triple role of risk aversion, inequality 
aversion and elasticity of intertemporal substitution parameter in the standard preference 
function mostly used in climate change economics. We show that the social cost of 
carbon lies anywhere in between 0 and $120,000/tC. However, if we restrict these two 
parameters to match observed behavior, an expected social cost of carbon of $60/tC 
results. If we correct this estimate for income differences across the world, the social 
cost of carbon rises to over $200/tC. 
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Estimates of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions require the 
aggregation of monetized impacts of climate change over people with different incomes 
and in different jurisdictions. Implicitly or explicitly, such estimates assume a social 
welfare function and hence a particular attitude towards equity and justice. In chapter 4 
we show that previous approaches to equity weighing are inappropriate from a national 
decision maker‟s point of view, because domestic impacts are not valued at domestic 
values. We propose four alternatives (sovereignty, altruism, good neighbour, and 
compensation) with differing views on concern for and liability towards foreigners. The 
four alternatives imply radically different estimates of the social cost of carbon and 
hence the optimal intensity of climate policy. 
A necessary condition of an efficient global climate change mitigation policy is to 
equate marginal abatement costs across world regions, so that the cheapest available 
abatement options are used. The welfare economic justification for such an approach 
rests on lump sum transfers between regions to compensate for any unwanted 
distributional consequences of such a policy. In chapter 5 I contrast this efficient 
solution with a second best situation in which lump sum transfers between regions are 
impossible. I derive that in the latter case optimal taxes are different for regions with 
different per capita consumption in a dynamic setting. I estimate the optimal tax rates 
with the integrated assessment model FUND and find that optimal mitigation is less 
stringent when equity is explicitly considered for widely used parameter choices of a 




Equation Chapter (Next) Section 1 
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I The Impact of Climate Change on the Balanced-
Growth-Equivalent: An Application of FUND 
1. Introduction 
The Stern Review on The Economics of Climate Change (Stern, 2007) has caused 
substantial discussion, not least about the validity of the headline conclusion that 
climate change would cause a welfare loss equivalent to a permanent income loss of 5 
to 20%. The initial responses of many economists (Arrow, 2007; Dasgupta, 2007; 
Mendelsohn, 2006; Nordhaus, 2007a; Nordhaus, 2007b; Pielke Jr, 2007; Tol, 2006c; 
Tol and Yohe, forthcoming; Weitzman, 2007; Yohe et al., 2007) focused on a variety of 
shortcomings of the research and the choice of the rates of pure time preference and risk 
aversion, but later reactions (Yohe and Tol, 2007; Weitzman, 2008) emphasized that the 
Stern Review has also brought renewed attention to the conceptual and moral difficulties 
of any economic appraisal of projects to limit climate change and its impacts. 
This paper contributes in four ways to the ongoing debate about the conclusions of the 
Stern Review. First, this paper uses a different integrated assessment model and is thus a 
sensitivity analysis of the conclusions of the Stern Review. Second, we extend the 
analysis conducted by the Stern Review with a regionally disaggregated welfare module. 
Third, we not only calculate the difference between scenarios with and without climate 
impacts, but evaluate specific policies in terms of changes in balanced growth 
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equivalents. Fourth, we propose a rigorous definition of the balanced growth equivalent, 
which was lacking from the Stern Review. 
The Stern Review diverged from the usual approaches of calculating the welfare impact 
of climate change employed in the literature (Pearce et al., 1996; Smith et al., 2001) in a 
number of ways. For one, it presented the results of its modelling exercise as changes in 
balanced growth equivalents (cf. Mirrlees and Stern, 1972). Previous studies of climate 
change had presented economic damages as total impacts for a benchmark scenario 
(typically, the effect of a doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide on today‟s population 
and economy).
1
 The introduction of a new measure is certainly a refreshing move, but it 
makes comparison with previous results difficult. One could attempt to infer what the 
results from the Stern Review are in the metrics used in previous studies. In this paper 
we choose the other direction: We use the welfare measure of the Stern Review but use 
the FUND model instead of PAGE. As such, this paper analyses how the results from 
the Stern Review depend on the specific assumptions made in the PAGE model. We also 
run the model with more combinations of input parameters than the Stern Review did, in 
particular we investigate sensitivity to all IPCC SRES scenarios and more discounting 
schemes. 
Mirrlees‟ and Stern‟s (1972) definition of the balanced growth equivalent is for a single 
decision maker and a constant population. The Stern Review’s calculation of welfare 
measures is based on globally averaged per capita consumption and a growing 
population.
2
 The Stern Review suggests that a more appropriate aggregation would take 
                                                 
1
 The marginal impacts according to the Stern Review can be compared to previous studies. Tol (2008) 
does exactly that and finds that the Stern Review is an outlier. 
2
 The text in the Stern Review is not clear on this point and Stern (2008, p. 18) claims that the welfare 
function used for the Stern Review is a function of regional per capita consumption, but subsequent 
private communication (Simon Dietz) with the Stern Review team and a look at the source code that was 
used for the Stern Review and provided to us in the meantime confirmed that the Stern Review operated 
with global and not regional per capita consumption. Similar ambiguity is illustrated by the exchange on 
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up regional data when deriving the welfare measure. Due to time constraints, the Stern 
Review seems not to have carried out those calculations. Here, we do use regional 
impacts, income, and population data to estimate changes in the balanced growth 
equivalent due to climate change. 
Finally, the Stern Review presented its results as differences between scenarios with no 
impacts from climate change at all and scenarios with climate change impacts. This 
cannot be regarded as an evaluation of policy options: There is no feasible policy option 
available today to avoid all climate change impacts in the future. A more meaningful 
result is obtained by looking at changes in welfare from feasible policy options. We 
here restrict the attention to one climate policy, described in section 4.3. 
Section 2 reviews the original definition of the balanced growth equivalent and shows 
our extension with non-constant populations, regional disaggregation, and uncertainty. 
While our derivations are relatively straightforward, they have not been presented 
before. The equations shown should avoid future ambiguities about the definition of the 
BGE and its extensions. Section 3 outlines the FUND model. Section 4 presents the 
numerical results. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Balanced growth equivalent 
2.1. Basic concept 
Mirrlees and Stern (1972) introduced the concept of a balanced growth equivalent 
(BGE) as a commodity measure of welfare. The thought was that when looking at 
policy proposals one could calculate the change in BGE for a particular policy and use 
that as a rough first estimate of whether further investigation of that policy would be 
warranted or whether the impact of that policy would be too small in the first place to 
                                                                                                                                               
abatement costs between Anderson (2007), Dietz et al. (2007), and Tol and Yohe (2006; 2007a). See also 
Weyant (2008). 
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warrant further research. The authors themselves suggest that there might be many 
broad economic policy options unexplored that would cause an increase of at least 1% 
in BGE and propose that those should attain more research time.
3
 The BGE as a welfare 
measure has largely been ignored in the economics literature: only 9 papers refer to 
Mirrlees and Stern (1972) according to the Web of Science, and none of these papers 
develops the BGE further or applies it. Stern (2007) appears to be the first application. 
The following will briefly review the original concept with the notation used for this 
paper. Since we will later use a numerical model to run simulations, we use discrete 
time for the model, unlike the original specification of BGE. One key exercise of this 
paper is to compare the effects of various policy options with respect to climate change 
in terms of welfare changes. Policy choices are represented by  . A specific policy 
choice   could for example designate one specific carbon tax schedule.   can stand 
for any policy out of all possible policy options, the numerical analysis later in the paper 
will restrict itself to a subset of policy options. 
Let welfare for a specific policy   be 







W U C P 


   (1.1) 
where 
,tC  is per capita consumption at time t  as it results from choosing policy  , P  
is population,   is the utility discount rate, U  is the utility function and T  is the time 
up to which the analysis is carried out. 
The BGE for policy   is then defined by solving4 
                                                 
3
 Note that the Stern Review and this paper use a different baseline than was originally suggested in 
Mirrlees and Stern (1972). They looked at improvements from the status quo, i.e. how a policy would 
improve the business as usual scenario. The Stern Review and this paper evaluate changes from a 
hypothetical world without climate change, where smaller changes (i.e. smaller damages) are better.  
4
 Note that equation (7) in chapter 6 in the Stern Review purports to define the BGE as used by Stern 
(2007, p. 185) and thus would play the same role as our equation (1.2). Unfortunately, equation (7) in the 
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   (1.2) 
for    , with   being a constant growth rate (that later drops out when changes in   
are calculated). Note that     is the initial level of per capita consumption that would 
give the same welfare as  W   if it grew at constant rate  . 
For a standard constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function 
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with   being the marginal elasticity of consumption, we have an explicit solution for  
 



















































     
   
 
       





Defining the relative change in BGE for two policies   and   as  , we get 
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review contains a number of errors: As printed, the function is not defined for 1  , a balanced growth 
path is given by  1
t
BGEC g  and not the term BGEC gt  that is printed in the Stern Review, and finally 
this wrong term for consumption at time t  is wrongly converted into utility by only putting 
BGE
C  into the 
utility function and then adding gt  to utility. Private communication with members of the Stern Review 
team (Simon Dietz, Nick Stern) and later comparison with the source code (also provided privately) used 
for the Stern Review assured us that these errors were only present in the text and that the equations used 
for the numerical results in the Stern Review did not contain these mistakes. Public availability of the 
source code and an errata (which we could not find) of the Stern Review could clear questions up for 
other readers of the Stern Review. 
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Note that   is independent of  , so that the change in BGE does not depend on the 
growth rate assumed in the calculation of a specific BGE – as long as the growth rates 
are the same for the two policy choices. The change in BGE thus expresses the 
difference between two scenarios as a constant change in relative consumption. It is an 
annuity, but an annuity that is based on the equivalence of net present welfare. 
Note that population is (assumed to be) independent of the policy choice. If population 
is endogenous to the policy decision, one cannot use a welfare function like Equation 
(1.1). See Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) and Blackorby et al. (1995). 
2.2. Uncertainty 
We now treat  ,W s  as a random variable where  p s  is the probability of state of 
the world s . Expected welfare then is 
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    (1.6) 
The certainty- and balanced growth equivalent (CBGE) is obtained be replacing  W   
in (1.2) with expected welfare  EW   as defined in (1.6). The CBGE can then be 
solved as: 
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The CBGE is the initial level of per capita consumption, which, if it grows without any 
uncertainty at some constant rate  , gives the same level of welfare as the expected 
welfare for some policy   as defined in (1.6). It is a combination of the certainty 
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equivalence ideas put forward by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) with the balanced 
growth equivalent of Mirrlees and Stern (1972). 


































     
 
  
   
   
    
 (1.8) 
As before, the growth scenario   cancels. 
2.3. Multiple regions 
In the final step, we introduce multiple regions. Assuming that the global welfare 
function is utilitarian, we have 
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for a deterministic analysis and 
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W p s U C P  


    (1.10) 
for an analysis with uncertainty. Per capita consumption C  and population P  are now 
fed into the welfare function for each region r  individually. 
Replacing  W   in (1.2) with the deterministic welfare function that is disaggregated 
by regions  EW   gives the equity- and balanced growth equivalent (EBGE) for a 
specific policy choice. This solves as: 
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This combines the BGE concept with a measure of inequality very much like 
Atkinson‟s (1970). The EBGE is the equally distributed (over the regions under 
consideration) initial per capita consumption, growing at a constant rate   that gives 
the same level of welfare as obtained for a specific policy choice   from the welfare 
function defined in (1.9). Note that (1.11) has a different treatment for income 
difference between regions and between generations (cf. Tol, 2002c). 
The certainty, equity- and balanced growth equivalent (CEBGE) follows by replacing 
 W   in (1.2) with the expected welfare from the regional disaggregated welfare 
function as defined in (1.10) for some policy choice  . This solves as: 
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which is the equally distributed (over the regions under consideration) initial per capita 
consumption growing without uncertainty at a constant rate  , that gives the same 
welfare level as the expected welfare of a certain policy choice   as obtained by using 
(1.10). 
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 (1.13) 





































     
 
  
   
   
    
 (1.14) 
Note that in Equation (1.14), the parameter   has a triple role. It is a measure of the 
curvature of the utility function – more specifically, the consumption elasticity of 
marginal utility – but it functions as the intertemporal substitution elasticity of 
consumption, the rate of risk aversion, and the rate of inequity aversion. Below, we refer 
to   as the rate of risk aversion. 
Tol and Yohe (2007b) show a similar derivation, but use the term certainty- and equity-
equivalent annuity because Equation (1.14) distributes the impact equally over time, as 
well as over states of the world and over regions. 
As stated in the introduction, we think that the Stern Review intended to report CE  as 
defined in Equation (1.14), but they seem to report C  (1.8) instead. 
3. The Model 
FUND (the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution) is an 
integrated assessment model linking projections of populations, economic activity and 
emissions to a simple carbon cycle and climate model, and to a model predicting and 
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monetizing welfare impacts. Climate change welfare impacts are monetarized in 1995 
dollars and are modelled over 16 regions. Modelled welfare impacts include agriculture, 
forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders influenced by cold and 
heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption, 
water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems (Link and Tol, 2004). The source code, 
data, and a technical description of the model can be found at http://www.fund-
model.org. 
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous 
perturbations. The model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United 
States of America, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central 
America, South America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa, and Small Island States. Version 3.2, used in this paper, runs from 1950 
to 2300 in time steps of one year. The primary reason for starting in 1950 is to initialize 
the climate change impact module. In FUND, the welfare impacts of climate change are 
assumed to depend in part on the impacts during the previous year, reflecting the 
process of adjustment to climate change. Because the initial values to be used for the 
year 1950 cannot be approximated very well, both physical impacts and monetized 
welfare impacts of climate change tend to be misrepresented in the first few decades of 




 centuries are included to provide a proper long-term 
perspective. 
The period of 1950-1990 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the 
IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes and Goldewijk, 1994). The period 1990-2000 is 
based on observations (http://earthtrends.wri.org). The 2000-2010 period is interpolated 
from the immediate past. The climate scenarios for the period 2010-2100 are based on 
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the EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in between IS92a and IS92f 
(Leggett et al., 1992). The period 2100-2300 is extrapolated. 
The scenarios are defined by varied rates of population growth, economic growth, 
autonomous energy efficiency improvements, and decarbonization of energy use 
(autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), as well as by emissions of carbon 
dioxide from land use change, methane emissions, and nitrous oxide emissions. 
Emission reduction of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide is specified as in Tol 
(2006b). Simple cost curves are used for the economic impact of abatement, with 
limited scope for endogenous technological progress and interregional spillovers (Tol, 
2005b). 
The scenarios of economic growth are perturbed by the effects of climatic change.
5
 
Climate-induced migration between the regions of the world causes the population sizes 
to change. Immigrants are assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the 
respective host population. 
The tangible welfare impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy. Consumption and 
investment are reduced without changing the savings rate. As a result, climate change 
reduces long-term economic growth, although consumption is particularly affected in 
the short-term. Economic growth is also reduced by carbon dioxide abatement 
measures. The energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy 
supply autonomously decrease over time. This process can be accelerated by abatement 
policies. 
                                                 
5
 Note that in the standard version of FUND population growth is also perturbed by climate change 
impacts. That particular feature was switched off in the runs for this paper because endogenous 
population changes cannot be evaluated with the kind of welfare function investigated, see discussion 
above. 
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The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the effect of carbon 
dioxide emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the effect of the 
damages on the economy caused by climate change. Methane and nitrous oxide are 
taken up in the atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted. The atmospheric 
concentration of carbon dioxide, measured in parts per million by volume, is 
represented by the five-box model of Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987). Its 
parameters are taken from Hammitt et al. (1992).  
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur aerosols is 
determined based on Shine et al. (1990). The global mean temperature, T , is governed 
by a geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing, RF ), 
with a half-life of 50 years. In the base case, the global mean temperature rises in 
equilibrium by 2.5°C for a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents. Regional 
temperature is derived by multiplying the global mean temperature by a fixed factor, 
which corresponds to the spatial climate change pattern averaged over 14 GCMs 
(Mendelsohn et al., 2000). The global mean sea level is also geometric, with its 
equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 50 years. Both 
temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best guess temperature and 
sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996). 
The climate welfare impact module, based on Tol (2002a; b) includes the following 
categories: agriculture, forestry, hurricanes, sea level rise, cardiovascular and 
respiratory disorders related to cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, 
schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption, water resources, and unmanaged 
ecosystems. Climate change related damages are triggered by either the rate of 
temperature change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/yr) or the level of temperature change 
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(benchmarked at 1.0°C). Damages from the rate of temperature change slowly fade, 
reflecting adaptation (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
In the model individuals can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne 
diseases, or they can migrate because of sea level rise. Like all welfare impacts of 
climate change, these effects are monetized. The value of a statistical life is set to be 
200 times the annual per capita income.
6
 The resulting value of a statistical life lies in 
the middle of the observed range of values in the literature (cf. Cline, 1992). The value 
of emigration is set to be three times the per capita income (Tol, 1995a; 1996), the value 
of immigration is 40 per cent of the per capita income in the host region (Cline, 1992). 
Losses of dryland and wetlands due to sea level rise are modelled explicitly. The 
monetary value of a loss of one square kilometre of dryland was on average $4 million 
in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). Dryland value is assumed to be 
proportional to GDP per square kilometre. Wetland losses are valued at $2 million per 
square kilometre on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). The wetland 
value is assumed to have a logistic relation to per capita income. Coastal protection is 
based on cost-benefit analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due to the 
construction of dikes and subsequent coastal squeeze. 
Other welfare impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, hurricanes, energy, water, 
and ecosystems, are directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer 
of impacts measured in their „natural‟ units (cf. Tol, 2002a). Modelled effects of climate 
change on energy consumption, agriculture, and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases 
explicitly recognize that there is a climatic optimum, which is determined by a variety 
of factors, including plant physiology and the behaviour of farmers. Impacts are positive 
                                                 
6
 Note that this implies that the monetary value of health risk is effectively discounted with the pure rate 
of time preference rather than with the consumption rate of discount (Horowitz, 2002). It also implies 
that, after equity weighing, the value of a statistical life is equal across the world (Fankhauser et al., 
1997). 
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or negative depending on whether the actual climate conditions are moving closer to or 
away from that optimum climate. Impacts are larger if the initial climate conditions are 
further away from the optimum climate. The optimum climate is of importance with 
regard to the potential impacts. The actual impacts lag behind the potential impacts, 
depending on the speed of adaptation. The impacts of not being fully adapted to new 
climate conditions are always negative (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
The welfare impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, hurricanes, 
unmanaged ecosystems, water resources, diarrhoea, malaria, dengue fever, and 
schistosomiasis are modelled as simple power functions. Impacts are either negative or 
positive, and they do not change sign (cf. Tol, 2002b).  
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and 
technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as 
water resources (with population growth) and heat-related disorders (with urbanization), 
or more valuable, such as ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes). Other 
systems are projected to become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with 
technological progress), agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and water-
borne diseases (with improved health care) (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
In the Monte Carlo analyses, essentially all parameters are varied. The probability 
density functions are mostly based on expert guesses, but where possible “objective” 
estimates were used. Parameters are assumed to vary independently of one another, 
except when there are calibration or accounting constraints. Details of the Monte Carlo 




Stern (2007) present the impacts of climate change as the change in BGE between a 
baseline scenario with no climate change impacts and various scenarios with climate 
impacts. This is a measure of the overall damage of climate change. We present similar 
results but add more sensitivity analysis. In particular, we present results for alternative 
assumptions on discounting and risk aversion, and include four alternative socio-
economic scenarios. 
We refer to these runs as total damage estimates. Contrary to what Stern (2007) assert, 
these estimates of the total impact of climate change differ from the estimated benefits 
of climate policy. Avoiding all climate change is impossible, and emission abatement 
slows economic growth. We therefore present a second set of results where we evaluate 
specific carbon taxation policies and calculate the change in BGE (or any of the more 
complicated concepts) from a hypothetical scenario with neither climate change impacts 
nor any policy costs to a scenario with both policy costs of carbon taxation and impacts 
of climate change. 
For any combination of socio economic scenario, pure rate of time preference, rate of 
risk aversion, uncertainty treatment and social welfare function, we calculated the BGE 
for two policy choices: One business as usual policy with no greenhouse gas taxation 
and the BGE for a particular policy choice. The latter is characterised as follows: 
Following a widely used practise, we impose a globally harmonized carbon tax on all 
regions. For the first time period we search for a carbon tax rate that equals the social 
cost of carbon emissions, which in turn depends on the choice and parameterisation of 
the social welfare function. We then increase this carbon tax with the world average 
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discount rate in every time period
7
. We then present results as a change in the BGE 
from a run without any climate change impacts or policy costs to the BGE of one of the 
two policy choices.  
In the following sections we point out our key findings both for the costless mitigation 
runs and the policy runs. 
4.2. Total damage 
Figure 1 shows the loss of going from a scenario without climate change impacts to a 
business as usual policy (i.e. a scenario with no climate change mitigation but full 
impacts) in terms of change of CBGE for various pure rates of time preference, risk 
aversion and socio-economic scenario choices. Figure 1 shows the mean change in BGE 
over all socio-economic scenarios, with the minimum and maximum shown on the error 
bars. The numbers in this figure form the model sensitivity analysis to the results of the 
Stern Review. 
In general, the numbers calculated by FUND tend to suggest lower total damages than 
the figures from the Stern Review, given apparently comparable welfare economic 
treatment.
8
 One difference is that FUND has a time horizon of 2300, while PAGE stops 
at 2200. In the Stern Review impacts were assumed to be constant as a fraction of 
income for the time period 2200 to infinity and fully accounted for in the welfare 
function, whereas we assume no impacts after 2300. Note that the very questionable 
assumption of constant damages until infinity after the year 2200 is not a feature of the 
PAGE model, but was only implemented for the results of the Stern Review, as far as we 
                                                 
7
 Note that this ignores a number of complicated issues. First, the rate of increase of the optimal carbon 
tax would be less than the discount rate due to the decay of carbon in the atmosphere. In our experience 
the difference in results between the two approaches is marginal and would not have justified the 
significant computational complications associated with it. Second, there is an ongoing debate in the 
literature whether a harmonized carbon tax is optimal (cf. Chichilnisky and Heal, 1994; Anthoff, 2009), 
but we ignore these issues in this paper. 
8
 Note that PAGE tends to report lower marginal impacts than FUND (Tol, 2008). 
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can tell. Probably the main driver for this effect is one crucial difference in modeling 
impacts in the model PAGE as used for the Stern Review and FUND: PAGE puts more 
emphasis on the negative impacts of climate change, i.e. it will rarely produce a net 
global benefit from an increase in temperature for any time step.
9
 FUND on the other 
hand has various sectors in which modest temperature increases in some regions can 
lead to net benefits, so that in particular in the earlier time periods impacts of climate 
change are positive for some regions.
10
 Besides, PAGE includes an arbitrary catastrophe 
caused by climate change, while FUND only includes identified impacts – which does 
not imply that FUND cannot produce very large impacts (Tol, 2003) or analyze 
supposedly catastrophic scenarios (Link and Tol, 2004). Furthermore, PAGE assumes 
that vulnerability to climate change is constant, while FUND has that regions grow less 
vulnerable as they grow richer. Sterner and Persson (2008) and Tol and Yohe (2007b) 
show that this is an important assumption. 
At the same time, our results mimic some key features of the Stern Review results: 
higher time preference rates and higher risk aversion always lead to lower impacts 
estimates. For time discounting, this is rather well established in the literature (e.g. Guo 
et al., 2006; Newell and Pizer, 2003). That higher   values lead to lower damages is 
less straight forward, as it controls two effects at the same time. First, the effective 
discount rate is increased, which certainly leads to lower damage estimates. Second, 
more weight is given to unlikely but bad outcomes, i.e. the decision maker is assumed 
to be more risk averse, which should lead to higher damage estimates. Figure 1 shows 
that the first effect strongly dominates the second in the kind of uncertainty analysis 
                                                 
9
 Note that PAGE does produce positive market impacts for some regions. 
10
 Initially positive economic impacts of climate change are not unique to FUND, and are not a new 
finding. See Smith et al. (2001). For detailed discussions of FUND’s estimated impacts and in particular 
their time profile as well as their regional distribution, see Tol (2002b) and Tol et al. (2003). 
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employed for this paper, i.e. that the increase in the discount rate offsets the increase in 
risk aversion. 
The Stern Review itself pointed out that a global welfare function cannot take into 
account how damages are distributed with respect to high/low income regions, and that 
a regional disaggregated welfare function would be a more appropriate choice. Figure 2 
shows results using a social welfare function that is disaggregated into 16 world 
regions, again with the mean (and minimum and maximum) of the socio-economic 
scenarios for total impacts. 
There are three key insights: First, using a disaggregated regional social welfare 
function always increases total damage estimates; second, the role of   is reversed; and 
third, high   values lead to estimates that are very large. 
We find higher damages for a regional disaggregated welfare function for all scenarios. 
A disaggregated regional welfare function in general gives higher weights to impacts in 
poor regions than in high income regions. In general (but not in every detail), FUND 
has more negative impacts in poor regions, so this result is not unexpected. 
With a regional welfare function,   plays a third role, namely that of inequality 
aversion, in addition to the parameter of risk aversion and substitution of consumption 
over time. With this third role added, the response of the total damage estimates to 
higher values for   is reversed, in particular the inequality and risk aversion aspect 
dominate the higher discount rate aspect of high   values and therefore total damage 
estimates increase with higher values for  . This directly points to one central problem 
with the kind of welfare function commonly employed in climate change analysis (and 
this paper), namely the over use of   to control three issues at the same time (cf. 
Beckerman and Hepburn, 2007). A number of the critics of the Stern Review (e.g. 
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Dasgupta, 2007) have argued that while a low pure rate of time preference might be 
acceptable, one should pick a higher value for  , so that the overall discount rate is 
more in line with market interest rates. In the context of a global welfare function as 
used by Stern (2007) this suggestion makes sense, but with a regional welfare function 
the effect on the estimated damage may be unexpected. 
Finally, we produce very large damage estimates for high   values with a regional 
welfare function. This is a direct manifestation of Weitzman‟s (2008) fat tail argument: 
Comparing the regional probabilistic results with deterministic runs, and a detailed 
analysis of the drivers of those extreme values shows that some regions approach very 
low consumption (subsistence) levels in some scenarios in our Monte Carlo analysis – 
and this implies that welfare in these regions, years and runs becomes large and 
negative, and potentially unboundedly so. With a global welfare function those extreme 
results in a few regions are averaged out, but with a regional welfare function these fat 
tails in single regions drive the analysis. 
4.3. Mitigation policy 
While an analysis of the total expected damage of climate change is of interest, a more 
policy relevant question is what improvement a realistic policy that would have both 
mitigation costs and avoided damage benefits accounted for could achieve. 
Table 1 compares the total damage of a scenario with no emission mitigation with the 
total damage of our mitigation policy scenario (in which case the total damage includes 
the now reduced impacts from climate change as well as the mitigation costs) for SRES 
scenario A2 for a probabilistic analysis. The A2 scenario is the scenario of choice in the 
Stern Review. For a global welfare function as used by the Stern Review, the best 
possible improvement is always significantly lower than the total damage estimate. 
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Except for runs with high   values, this conclusion also holds for a regional welfare 
function. The runs with 2   have to be interpreted with care, since the manifestation 
of fat-tails showing up there might make the framework used to determine our policy 
response less appropriate. 
A global welfare function underestimates by a large margin the improvements that can 
be obtained by an actual mitigation policy. Table 2 compares the carbon tax levels in the 
year 2000 for the A2 scenario. Note the discrepancy in the results. While our total 
impact estimate is 3% for η=1 and ρ=0.1% compared to Stern‟s 5%, our social cost of 
carbon is $41/tC compared to Stern‟s $314/tC. This is probably explained by the highly 
non-linear impact function in the (adjusted) PAGE model. While the initial tax is higher 
for a regional welfare function, the change in the BGE for a regional welfare function is 
much larger for the mitigation policy than the change in the tax level. The prime reason 
for this is that the introduction of a regional welfare function not only gives more 
weight to damages in low income regions, but mitigation costs in poor regions also get a 
higher weight, thereby balancing the effect of the regional welfare function somewhat. 
Table 3 highlights the importance of distributional issues and uncertainty in climate 
change. Table 3 shows our estimate of the total impacts of climate change using a 
global welfare function ignoring uncertainty and compares this to the regional welfare 
function. In the global welfare function, global average impacts are computed before 
being converted to utility. In the regional welfare function, regional average impacts are 
converted to utility and then averaged for the world. Irrespective of the rates of pure 
time preference or risk aversion, the regional welfare function implies impacts that are 
substantially higher. This is well-known in the literature (Azar and Sterner, 1996; 
Fankhauser et al., 1997; Azar, 1999; Anthoff et al., 2009). It appears that the Stern 
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Review overlooked this. With uncertainty, the difference between a global and a 
regional welfare function is even stronger. 
Qualitatively, the results for the A2 scenario hold for the other scenarios as well. 
Quantitatively, the results are different, of course, and where the relationship is 
ambiguous (e.g., between   and  ), different scenarios may show different signs. 
Table 4 shows the total impact of climate change for five alternative socio-economic 
and emissions scenarios. The A2 scenario is generally in the middle of the range. Hotter 
(FUND) and poorer (B2) scenarios show higher impacts, while cooler (B1) and richer 
(A1b) scenarios show lower impacts. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper defines various balanced growth equivalences, and applies them to compute 
the impacts of climate change and the benefits of emission reduction with the integrated 
assessment model FUND. We conduct a wider sensitivity analysis than run by the Stern 
Review. We find that the impacts of climate change are sensitive to the pure rate of time 
preference, the rate of risk aversion, the level of spatial disaggregation, the inclusion of 
uncertainty, and the socio-economic scenario. Our results span a wider range in both 
directions compared to the Stern Review, thereby questioning the assertion that the high 
results obtained by the Stern Review are robust. We find that the guess of the Stern 
Review that a regional welfare function might increase overall damage estimates by a 
quarter (Stern, 2007, p. 187) is very conservative. In our runs, the introduction of a 
regional welfare function, in particular in combination with a high risk aversion, has a 
much larger effect on the results. Finally, we show that the Stern Review was wrong to 
equate the impact of climate change and the benefits of emission reduction – their 
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“optimal” climate policy does not maximise welfare in the mathematical sense of the 
word. Qualitatively, this was known. Quantitatively, we show that this is a big mistake. 
The results also show areas that need more research work. This includes improved 
socio-economic and climate scenarios, and better and more complete estimates of the 
impacts of climate change. In particular, disentangling intertemporal substitution from 
risk aversion and inequality aversion is a high priority (e.g., Carlsson et al., 2005). With 
only one parameter to control three important effects, as commonly used in climate 
policy analysis, model- and scenario-specific ambiguities emerge. The fat tails that 
showed up in some of our results with high risk aversion and a regional welfare function 
are another area for further research. 
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 η=1.0 η=1.5 η=2.0 
Global welfare function 
ρ=0.1% 1.33% (3.27%) 0.85% (2.40%) 0.40% (1.49%) 
ρ=1.0% 0.40% (1.55%) 0.19% (0.92%) 0.08% (0.46%) 
ρ=3.0% 0.01% (0.03%) 0.02% (-0.07%) 0.01% (-0.14%) 
Regional welfare function 
ρ=0.1% 4.27% (9.24%) 27.86% (32.60%) 91.07% (91.67%) 
ρ=1.0% 1.52% (5.12%) 9.74% (13.95%) 70.58% (72.11%) 
ρ=3.0% 0.08% (1.56%) 0.61% (3.29%) 10.25% (13.73%) 
Table 1: Change in CBGE and CEBGE from a scenario without climate impacts to a 





 η=1.0 η=1.5 η=2.0 
Global welfare function 
ρ=0.1% 40.63 23.75 11.88 
ρ=1.0% 15.63 6.88 3.13 
ρ=3.0% 0.63 0.63 0.63 
Regional welfare function 
ρ=0.1% 51.25 54.38 50.63 
ρ=1.0% 21.25 25.63 31.25 
ρ=3.0% 2.50 6.88 7.50 
Table 2: Carbon tax ($/tC in 1995 USD) in the year 2000 for SRES A2 scenario under a 
probabilistic analysis for the mitigation policy 
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 η=1.0 η=1.5 η=2.0 
Global welfare function 
ρ=0.1% 1.53% 0.59% -0.15% 
ρ=1.0% 0.07% -0.46% -0.76% 
ρ=3.0% -0.92% -0.95% -0.95% 
Regional welfare function 
ρ=0.1% 3.05% 2.67% 2.48% 
ρ=1.0% 1.06% 1.20% 1.72% 
ρ=3.0% -0.51% 0.40% 1.42% 
Table 3: Change in BGE and EBGE for total damage estimates for a business as usual 
scenario for SRES scenario A2 without uncertainty 
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 η=1.0   η=1.5   η=2.0   
 ρ =0.1% ρ=1.0% ρ=3.0% ρ=0.1% ρ=1.0% ρ=3.0% ρ=0.1% ρ=1.0% ρ=3.0% 
Global welfare function 
FUND 4.50% 2.25% 0.23% 3.45% 1.45% 0.06% 2.24% 0.80% -0.05% 
A1b 1.49% 0.49% -0.20% 0.56% 0.02% -0.28% -0.01% -0.21% -0.32% 
A2 3.27% 1.55% 0.03% 2.40% 0.92% -0.07% 1.49% 0.46% -0.14% 
B1 0.09% -0.16% -0.32% -0.13% -0.26% -0.33% -0.25% -0.30% -0.33% 
B2 3.42% 1.57% -0.01% 2.59% 0.97% -0.11% 1.66% 0.49% -0.19% 
Regional welfare function 
FUND 11.30% 6.45% 1.89% 37.26% 18.28% 4.14% 92.74% 78.66% 24.20% 
A1b 4.83% 2.54% 0.94% 14.87% 5.38% 1.97% 80.28% 44.69% 5.72% 
A2 9.24% 5.12% 1.56% 32.60% 13.95% 3.29% 91.67% 72.11% 13.73% 
B1 1.92% 1.22% 0.70% 2.39% 1.98% 1.77% 3.42% 3.04% 2.99% 
B2 8.35% 4.46% 1.40% 25.60% 11.02% 3.03% 88.74% 65.82% 12.00% 
Table 4: Total damages for probabilistic runs by socio-economic scenario 
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II Global Sea-Level Rise and Equity Weighting 
1. Introduction 
Sea-level rise due to human-induced climate change has caused concern for coastal 
areas since the issue emerged more than 20 years ago. Rapid sea-level rise (>1-
m/century) raises most concern as it is commonly felt that this would overwhelm the 
capacity of coastal societies to respond and lead to large losses and a widespread forced 
coastal retreat (e.g., Overpeck et al., 2006). While the IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007) suggests 
that a rise of >1-m/century is highly unlikely during the 21
st
 Century, others argue that 
this remains an important issue for scientific analysis (Rahmstorf, 2007; Rahmstorf et 
al., 2007). Less appreciated is the so-called „commitment to sea-level rise‟ whereby 
even if the climate is stabilized immediately, sea levels continue to rise for many 
centuries due to the long timescales of the oceans and the large ice sheets (Nicholls et 
al., 2006a; Nicholls and Lowe, 2006). 
To date few studies have considered large rises in sea level rise – the few analyses tend 
to focus on exposure (i.e. potential impacts) only (Nicholls et al., 2006a). This paper 
also includes a coastal protection response. It builds on the earlier global analysis of 
Nicholls et al. (2006c) and provides evidence on the consequences of large rises in sea 
level over the 21
st
 Century using the coastal module of an integrated assessment model 
(FUND: The Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution) for 
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scenarios of sea-level rise in the range of 0.5 to 2 meters (which are consistent with the 
extremes analysis of Arnell et al. (2005)). The model calculates the welfare loss due to 
rising sea levels for a number of socio-economic scenarios, assumes some basic 
adaptation of humans to sea-level rise (a simple choice between protect and retreat) and 
aggregates damages for a number of assumed damage types. 
The results are presented using standard discounting methodology and using equity 
weights. The use of equity weights in the context of climate change was first suggest by 
Pearce et al. (1996) and since then a number of studies have applied equity weights on a 
regional scale in the context of climate change (Azar and Sterner, 1996; Tol et al., 1996; 
Azar, 1999; Tol, 1999; Pearce, 2003; Anthoff et al., 2009). This paper is the first to 
present damage estimates that use equity weights on a national basis. Equity weights 
correspond to the intuition that „a dollar to a poor person is not the same as a dollar to a 
rich person‟. More formally, the marginal utility of consumption is declining in 
consumption: a rich person will obtain less utility from an extra dollar available for 
consumption compared to a poor person. Equity-weighted damage estimates take into 
account that the same monetary damage to someone who is poor causes greater welfare 
loss than if that damage had happened to someone who is rich. Using national data 
instead of regional data for such an exercise is important in order to avoid smoothing of 
income inequalities by using larger regions to calculate average per capita incomes. Use 
of equity weights is particular appropriate in the context of sea-level rise, given the huge 
difference in income of those effected and the difficulties to assess the true welfare loss 
in such a situation without using a concept like equity weighting. 
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2. Model 
The Coastal Module of FUND 2.8n is used to calculate damages
11
 caused by various 
scenarios of sea-level rise over the next century (see Figure 3). This section will give a 
brief outline of the model components relevant to the calculation of sea-level rise 
damages. More details of the FUND coastal module can be found in Tol (2007) and 
Nicholls, Tol et al. (2006b). 
The model is driven by exogenous scenarios of population and GDP growth on a per 
country scale. Five distinct socio-economic scenarios are evaluated for this study: the 
four well-known SRES scenarios A1, A2, B1 and B2 downscaled from the original 
source (Nakicenovic and Swart, 2000) and a control scenario of constant population and 
GDP at 1995 levels over the 21st century (termed C1995)
12
. 
Sea-level rise is specified as a global exogenous scenario. Three distinct scenarios are 
examined: a rise of 0.5-m, 1.0-m and 2.0-m above today‟s (2005) sea levels in the year 
2100. These correspond to rates of 0.5m per 95 years, 1.0m per 95 years and 2.0m per 
95 years, respectively. For the sake of simplicity, sea-level rise for the time steps 
between 2005 and 2100 is a linear interpolation. 
Rising sea levels are assumed to have four damage cost components: (1) the value of 
dryland lost, (2) the value of wetland lost, (3) the cost of protection (with dikes) against 
rising sea levels and (4) the costs of displaced people that are forced to leave their 
original place of settlement due to dryland loss (Figure 3). FUND determines the 
optimum amount of protection (in benefit-cost terms) based on the socio-economic 
                                                 
11
 In this paper, all the costs of sea-level rise are considered damages, including protection costs. 
12
1995 was chosen as the base year for the control scenario purely on technical modeling grounds. FUND 
internally uses that year as its base year. Since the objective for the control scenario is not to produce a 
prediction what would happen without economic growth from now on (which in itself would be a silly 
endeavor), but rather to get an idea of what role economic growth plays, and since socio-economic 
parameters relevant to FUND have changed little in the time between 1995 to 2005 compared to what 
they change over the model period, this choice seems warranted. 
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situation, the expected damage of sea-level rise if no protection existed, and the 
necessary protection costs. Unprotected dryland is assumed to be lost, while wetland 
loss is also influenced by the amount of protection: more protection leads to greater 
wetland loss via coastal squeeze. Wetland loss due to coastal squeeze is counted as a 
cost of protection. The number of people displaced is a linear function of dryland loss. 
The area of dryland loss is assumed to be a linear function of sea-level rise and 




Wetland value is assumed to be logistic in per capita income, with a correction for 




















     
 (2.1) 
where 
,t iV  is wetland value at time t  in country i ; y  is per capita income; L  is the 
wetland lost to date; maxL  is a parameter, given the maximum amount of wetland that 
can be lost to sea-level rise;   is a parameter such that the average value for the OECD 
is $5 million per square kilometre; and 0.05   is a parameter. 
The number of people forced to migrate from a country due to sea-level rise is a 
function of the average population density in the country and the area of dry land lost. 
The cost of people displaced is three times average per capita income. 
Following the method of Nicholls et al. (2006b), average annual protection costs are 
assumed to be a bilinear function of the rate of sea-level rise as well as the proportion of 
the coast that is protected. This is a first step to overcoming the linear assumptions of 
the FUND model. The costs increase by an order of magnitude if sea-level rise is faster 
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than 1 cm per year (i.e., protection costs are much higher for the 1-m and 2-m rise 
scenarios than the 0.5-m scenarios). The level of protection is based on a cost-benefit 
analysis that compares the costs of protection (the actual construction of the protection 
and the value of the wetland lost due to the protection) with the benefits, i.e. the avoided 
dry land loss. 
The level of protection is based on a cost-benefit analysis. The level of protection is 
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 (2.2) 
where L  is the fraction of the coastline to be protected. PC  is the net present value of 
the protection cost if the whole coast is protected, WL  is the net present value of 
wetland lost if the whole coast would be protected and DL  is the net present value of 
dryland lost if no protection would take place. 
PC  is calculated assuming annual protection costs are constant, which is justified for 
the following three reasons: Firstly, the coastal protection decision makers anticipate a 
linear sea level rise. Secondly, coastal protection entails large infrastructural works, 
which which have a life of decades. Thirdly, the considered costs are direct investments 
only, and technologies for coastal protection are mature. Throughout the analysis, a pure 
rate of time preference,  , of 1% per year is used. The actual discount rate lies thus 1% 
above the growth rate of per capita income of the economy, g . The net present costs of 
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  (2.3) 
where aPC  is the average annual costs of protection, which is constant. 
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WL  is the net present value of the wetlands lost due to full coastal protection. Land 
values are assumed to rise at the same pace as per capita income growth. The amount of 
wetland lost per year is assumed to be constant. The net present costs of wetland loss 
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     
  (2.4) 
where 
,t iWL  denotes the value of wetland loss in the year and country the decision is 
made (see above). 
DL  denotes the net present value of the dryland lost if no protection takes place. Land 
values are assumed to rise at the same pace as per capita income growth. The amount of 
dryland lost per year is assumed to be constant. The net present costs of dryland loss 
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   
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  (2.5) 
where ,t iDL  is the value of dryland loss in the year and country the decision is made 
(see above). 
For a more complete discussion of sea-level rise in the context of climate change, see 
Nicholls and Tol (2006) and Nicholls et al.(2006c).  
The damage costs presented in this paper are the total damage costs for the period 2005-
2100. Two different welfare functions are used to aggregate damages across time and 
space, depending on whether equity weights are employed or not. Without equity 
weights, monetary damages for every country are calculated, then discounted per 
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country using a social discount rate with a pure rate of time preference of 1% and then 
those totals for every country are summed as follows: 
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where D  is total damage from sea-level rise, ,t iD  is damage in country i  at time t , ,t ig  
is the average per capita growth rate of consumption in country i  from the start of the 
time period to time t , N  is the number of countries and T  is the end of the time period 
under consideration.   is a parameter for inequality aversion (set to 1 for this paper) 
and   is the pure rate of time preference (set to 1% for this paper). 
Equity weighting follows the reasoning outlined in Anthoff et al. (2009). When equity 
weights are employed, the equation for the aggregation of damages is derived explicitly 
from a utilitarian social-welfare function as follows: 
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Where W  is welfare, ,t iC  is average per capita income in country i  at time t , ,t iP  is 
population and  .U  is the utility function. For this paper the usual logarithmic utility 
function   lnU c c  is employed. Such a utility function reflects the intuition that a 
dollar is worth more to a poor person than to a rich person, i.e. it has a declining 
marginal utility of consumption. 
As a linear approximation, damages from sea-level rise are multiplied with the marginal 
welfare change of consumption of the country they occur to before they are summed: 
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This gives the welfare loss from sea-level rise in welfare units. In order to convert back 
to monetary units, one has to multiply the results with the marginal. We follow 
Fankhauser et al. (1997) and normalise with world average per capita income. 
Conceptually this is just a linear transformation of the welfare function, i.e. the optimal 
solution of the welfare function is not altered by such an operation. The damage 
calculated such is 
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where ewD  is the equity-weighted damage and 0C  is world average per capita income at 
time 0, in our case in the year 2005. Equation (2.9) can be approximated as 













     (2.10) 
where 
,t ig  is the average growth rate of per capita income between year 0 and year t . 
The right most term is thus the neoclassical discount rate of money. The term 0 0,iC C  is 
the equity weight for every country. It can be seen that countries with higher average 
per capita income than the world average will receive a lower weight and countries with 
lower per capita income a higher weight, following the logic of equity weighting. 
3. Results 
Results from the model runs are analyzed along the following dimensions: (1) global 
damage costs by scenario; (2) the damage cost components; (3) regional impacts; (4) 
impacts without protection; and (5) equity-weighted results. 
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3.1. Global damage costs by socio-economic and sea-level rise scenarios 
While the choice of socio-economic scenario has an influence on the global damage 
costs from sea-level rise for the time period analysed for this study, the damage costs 
vary more over the choice of sea-level rise scenario (Figure 4). 
The damage costs for a 1m rise are between 4.8 and 5.2 times as high as the damage 
costs for the 0.5m sea-level rise, depending on the scenario (except for the 1995 control 
scenario, where the increase in costs is only 4 times). The increase in costs from 1m to 
2m is only 2.0 times the damage cost of the 1m sea-level rise scenario. The assumed 
bilinear protection costs between the scenario with 0.5m rise and 1m rise explains these 
different increases in damage costs with respect to sea-level rise. While the increase in 
damage costs from the 1m to 2m sea-level rise scenario is almost linear (i.e., a factor of 
two) over all socio-economic scenarios, the choice of socio-economic scenario has a 
more significant role to play in the step between the 0.5m and 1m sea-level rise 
scenario. In all cases (except the 1995 control scenario) the increase of the total damage 
is lower than the assumed tenfold increase in protection costs. The overall difference 
between the SRES scenarios is very small. 
While the damages from sea-level rise are substantial, they are small compared to the 
total economy, provided that coastal protection is built. This also holds for the 2m 
scenario. Note that the global total of Figure 4 hides considerable differences between 
countries. This issue is discussed in more detail below. 
In order to understand the reasons for the differences between the scenarios, a closer 
look at the four damage cost components is needed. 
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3.2. Disaggregating damage costs by socio-economic and sea-level rise scenarios 
Figure 5 shows the damage cost components as calculated by FUND and their share of 
the total damage cost for the 0.5m sea-level rise scenario under the assumption that 
dikes are built, i.e. that people attempt to protect against rising sea levels following 
current practise against coastal flooding in much of the world (e.g., East Asia and 
Europe). The results changes dramatically when it is assumed that people do not protect, 
a scenario that is analysed in a later section. 
Ignoring the control scenario for a moment, three conclusions can be drawn. First, 
damage costs from dryland loss and migration are a fraction of the costs of protection in 
every scenario (dryland costs being about one fifth and migration being one tenth of 
protection costs). Protection costs on the other hand are the most important component 
for every scenario. This underlines the significance of protection (and adaptation in 
general). Second, protection costs are less affected by the choice of socio-economic 
scenario than dryland loss and migration costs. The biggest difference between 
scenarios for dryland loss and migration costs is a factor of 1.8, for protection costs it is 
1.5. Damage costs from wetland loss are even less sensitive to the choice of scenario, 
with a maximum difference of factor 1.3. Wetland costs are the second most significant 
damage component in all scenarios. Third, for every cost component except wetland 
loss, the highest cost scenario is A2, followed by B2, B1 and A1. For wetland costs, the 
order is reversed, because wetland cost differences between scenarios are mainly driven 
by the differences in valuation between socio-economic scenarios: higher per capita 
income place a higher value on wetland loss and therefore produce higher wetland costs. 
With the other damage costs, higher per capita income mainly leads to more protection, 
which explains why the effect of higher per capita income is positive in those cases. 
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Figure 6 presents the disaggregation into damage components for the 1m sea-level rise 
scenario. Wetland costs are the only ones that react roughly linearly to the doubling of 
sea-level rise, they are around two times as high as for the 0.5m sea-level rise in all 
scenarios. Protection costs increase between 4.2 to 6.6 times compared to the lower sea-
level rise scenario, while dryland loss and migration costs increase by an order of 
magnitude (factors between 10.7 and 11.4) compared to the lower sea-level rise 
scenario. Due to the increase in adaptation costs (i.e. the bilinear nature of protection 
costs), adaptation is significantly more costly in the 1m sea-level rise scenario and the 
cost-benefit analysis finds that the optimal length of coast to protect is lower than in the 
0.5m scenario (e.g. it is about 40% lower averaged over time for the A1 scenario, 46% 
lower for A2, 42% lower for B1 and 45% lower for B2), which leads to a situation 
where total damage is more evenly divided between the four damage cost components. 
While the step from 0.5m to 1m sea-level rise changed the distribution of costs between 
the four components significantly, the step to the 2m scenario has no such surprises. As 
can be seen in Figure 7, all costs roughly double compared to the 1m scenario. This is 
not surprising, since the model does not have a change in cost assumptions build into 
this step. 
3.3. Regional Distribution of Damage Costs 
Sea-level rise damages are not evenly distributed over the world. Figure 8 compares the 
two scenarios that show the largest difference in total damage cost due to sea-level rise 
across all regions. While the distribution of damage costs is not the same for the two 
scenarios, the same countries bear the majority of damage costs in both scenarios. This 
should not be a surprise as relative exposure to sea-level rise is the main variable that 
drives relative damages and for example, East Asia and South Asia have large, densely-
populated coastal lowlands irrespective of the scenario considered. 
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The three regions that are widely thought to be the most vulnerable to sea-level rise, i.e. 
the Pacific, Indian Ocean and Caribbean islands bear only a tiny share of the total global 
damage. At the same time these damage costs for the small island states are enormous 
in relation to the size of their economy (Nicholls and Tol, 2006). Together with deltaic 
areas, they will find it hardest to raise the finances necessary to implement protection. 
3.4. Protection Analysis 
The level of protection, that is the length of coastline that is protected using dikes, is 
normally determined endogenously by a cost-benefit analysis in FUND. Another set of 
runs where no protection against sea-level rise is allowed were also conducted (and, for 
the first time, reported in a FUND analysis). Comparing these two sets of runs with and 
without protection is insightful for three reasons. First, it shows the huge benefits of 
protection to sea-level rise in terms of the damages avoided. Second, there might be 
countries that do not have the means to protect their coastline up to the optimal level 
that would follow from the cost-benefit analysis. This is especially relevant for large 
rises in sea level as considered in this analysis (Nicholls et al., 2006b). Third, all too 
often, sea level rise impacts are presented without coastal protection. This allows for a 
comparison between such studies and FUND. 
Figure 9 clearly shows the importance of protection, in particular for the 0.5m sea-level 
rise scenario. Total damages are between 3.4 and 3.7 times higher when no protection is 
build for that scenario, depending on the socio-economic scenario. For 1m and 2m sea-
level rise the damages in the no-protection scenario are only around 1.4 times as high 
compared to a protection scenario. Since protection costs are assumed to be ten times 
higher than in the 0.5m case, this is hardly surprising. A look at the control Scenario 
C1995 is particularly interesting in this case. In that scenario, population and economic 
indicators are held constant at 1995 levels, while sea-level rise is assumed to take place. 
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Especially in the two scenarios with high protection costs (1m and 2m) the importance 
of the significant economic development assumed in all the SRES scenarios can be 
seen: In both cases, effective protection is hardly possible under the assumption of 
today‟s socio-economic situation. The lesson to be learned from this is twofold: (1) 
protection can significantly lower total damages, but (2) only when economic growth 
enables this sometimes costly investment in protection. 
Some of the results for no protection scenarios are peculiar at first sight. For example, 
the Maldives are estimated to be completely inundated in 2085 for the 1-m rise scenario, 
which raises the value of its dryland for the time step 2080-4 to very large values. After 
2085, the value is zero. This cannot be regarded as a satisfactory valuation from an 
economic point of view: Such non-marginal damages are outside of the realm of 
economic valuation. The Maldives disappear much earlier (2050) for the 2m sea-level 
rise scenarios without protection, so that the costs of the 2m scenario fall below that of 
the 1m between 2050 and 2085. 
Figure 10 displays the benefit gained from protection for specific countries. It shows 
that protection is a lot more important for some countries than for others. 
3.5. Equity weighting 
Figure 11 compares damages from sea level that are equity weighted with estimates that 
are not weighted – or rather, that are weighted with the particular assumption that a 
dollar to a poor woman equals a dollar to a rich woman. Damages are between 2.9 and 
3.2 times higher when equity weights are employed. The equity-weighted results give 
an idea of how large the welfare loss due to sea-level rise is, when the distribution of 
income of those damaged is taken into consideration. Equity-weighing makes the 
smallest difference in the B1 scenario, which assumes rapid convergence of per capita 
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income, and the largest difference in the A2 scenario for which income convergence is 
slower. However, the effect of equity weighing is much smaller than the difference in 
2100 income distributions would suggest. This is because, in the first part of the 
scenario, the income distribution is determined by the 2000 income distribution, which 
is equal between the scenarios. 
Figure 12 disaggregates the results for some example countries. Two forces drive the 
results. Damages in high income countries, like the United States, are scaled down by a 
significant proportion, in this case the damage estimates for the United States without 
equity weights are six times higher than with equity weights. For low income countries, 
the result of applying equity weights is just the opposite: Bangladesh‟s damage 
estimates for example are 12 times higher with equity weighting compared to 
unweighted monetary results. The application of equity weights therefore is not uniform 
on the whole world: They will increase damage estimates for countries that have a per 
capita income below world average and decrease damages for countries with per capita 
income above world average. Given that more impacts accrue in low income places, the 
overall effect of applying equity weights is to increase global damage estimates. 
4. Discussion/Conclusions 
This analysis with FUND suggests that if sea-level rise was up to 2-m per century, 
while the costs of sea-level rise increase due to greater damage and protection costs, an 
optimum response in a benefit-cost sense remains widespread protection of developed 
coastal areas, as identified in earlier analyses (Nicholls and Tol, 2006; Nicholls et al., 
2006b). This analysis also shows that the benefits of protection increase significantly 
with time due to the economic growth assumed in the SRES socio-economic scenarios. 
Due to the different assumptions about population and gross domestic product, the 
socio-economic scenarios are also important drivers of these costs. In terms of the four 
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components of costs considered in FUND, protection dominates, with substantial costs 
from wetland loss under some scenarios. The regional distribution of costs shows a few 
regions experience most of the costs, especially South Asia, South America, North 
America, Europe, East Asia and Central America. Under a scenario of no protection, the 
costs of sea-level rise increase greatly due to land loss and population displacement: this 
scenario shows the significant benefits of the protection response in reducing the overall 
costs of sea-level rise. 
While the FUND analysis suggests widespread protection, earlier analysis shows that 
the actual adaptation response to sea-level rise is more complex than the benefit-cost 
approach used in FUND (Tol and Fankhauser, 1998; Nicholls and Tol, 2006). Building 
on these views, there are several factors to consider. Firstly, the aggregated scale of 
analysis in FUND may overestimate the extent of protection as shown by more detailed 
multi-scale analyses of parts of the UK and Germany (Turner et al., 1995; Sterr, 2007). 
It is also worth noting that retreat is now being considered more seriously, especially in 
parts of Europe (DEFRA, 2004; EUROSION, 2004; DEFRA, 2006; Rupp-Armstrong 
and Nicholls, 2007), driven by multiple goals including maintaining coastal wetlands. 
However, this is unlikely to change the qualitative conclusion that protection can be 
justified in more developed locations, even given a large rise in sea level. Secondly, the 
SRES socio-economic scenarios are quite optimistic about future economic growth: 
lower growth may lead to lower damages in monetary terms, but it will also reduce the 
capacity to protect as shown in these analyses. Strong growth underpins the investment 
necessary to protect. Thirdly, the benefit-cost approach implies perfect knowledge and a 
proactive approach to the protection, while historical experience shows most protection 
has been a reaction to actual or near disaster. Therefore, high rates of sea-level rise may 
lead to more frequent coastal disasters, even if the ultimate response is better protection. 
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Fourthly, even though it is economically rational to protect, there are questions of who 
pays and who benefits, and in some cases such as islands and deltas the diversion of 
investment from other uses could overwhelm the capacity of these societies to protect 
(cf. Fankhauser and Tol, 2005). As the benefit-costs ratios improves with time, it 
appears that near-term decisions on protection may have important consequences for the 
long-term direction of the adaptation response to sea-level rise. Fifthly, building on the 
fourth point, FUND assumes that the pattern of coastal development persists and attracts 
future development. However, major disasters such as New Orleans and Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 could trigger coastal abandonment, and hence have a profound 
influence on society‟s future choices concerning coastal protection as the pattern of 
coastal occupancy might change radically. A cycle of decline in some coastal areas is 
not inconceivable, especially in future worlds where capital is highly mobile and 
collective action is weaker. As the issue of sea-level rise is so widely known, 
disinvestment from coastal areas may even be triggered without disasters: for example, 
small islands may be highly vulnerable if investors are cautious (cf. Barnett and Adger, 
2003; Gibbons and Nicholls, 2006).  
For these above reasons, protection may not be as widespread as suggested in this 
analysis, especially for the largest scenario of 2m/century. However, the FUND analysis 
shows that protection is more likely and rational than is widely assumed, even with a 
large rise in sea level. The common assumption of a widespread retreat from the shore is 
not inevitable and coastal societies will have more choice in their response to this issue 
than is often assumed. 
While the no protection scenarios have damages that transcend the marginal valuation 
framework of economics and therefore have to be examined with care, it is also clear 
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from this analysis that – under the assumption that protection is built – such non-
marginal losses of land do not occur and calculation of damage costs is possible. 
The equity-weighted results highlight how important it is to not only look at the 
absolute magnitude of damage but also who will be affected. The welfare loss of even 
small damages to poor societies can be enormous. There is no consensus within the 
economic literature that equity-weighted damages ought to be used when policy 
instruments like Pigouvian taxes are designed, and hence the results presented here 
should not be used without further investigation for policy design. But there is little 
question that as a measure of actual welfare loss happening, equity-weighted results are 
much more accurate than pure monetary damage estimates. The question of what to do 
about the discrepancy in severity of impacts to poor and rich people is an ethical one, 
but in calculating damage estimates these differences should be made explicit to not 
under- or overstate the true welfare loss that climate change might cause, as we have 
done with the equity-weighted results in this paper. 
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Figure 4: Total damage costs due to sea-level rise for 0.5m, 1m and 2m sea-level rise in 
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Figure 5: Damage costs of sea-level rise over the four damage cost components for 
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Figure 6: Damage costs of sea-level rise over the four damage cost components for 1m 
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Figure 7: Damage costs of sea-level rise over the four damage cost components for 2m 
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Figure 8: Damage costs of sea-level rise by region for 1m sea-level rise in 2100 for 
scenario A1 (highest costs) and A2 (lowest costs) with protection 
 
  

















































































Figure 10: Damage costs of sea-level rise for 0.5m sea-level rise in 2100 for scenario 
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Figure 12: Damage costs of sea-level rise for 1m sea-level rise in 2100 with protection 
for scenario B1 
 















III Risk Aversion, Time Preference, and the Social Cost 
of Carbon 
1. Introduction 
The social cost of carbon (the SCC) estimates the discounted value of the damage 
associated with climate change impacts that would be avoided by reducing carbon 
emissions by one tonne. It is a useful measure for assessing the benefits of climate 
policy at any point in time. It is generally thought to increase over time, and textbook 
economics would recommend that carbon emissions be taxed by a price set equal to the 
SCC. The Stern Review (Stern, 2007; Stern and C.Taylor, 2007; Stern, 2008) reported a 
SCC in excess of $300/tC in the absence of any climate policy – an estimate that lies 
well above the upper bound of $50/tC that was found in an extensive literature survey 
and meta-analysis (Tol, 2005c). Many analysts have attributed this high estimate to the 
very low rate of pure time preference adopted by the Stern author team (Arrow, 2007; 
Jensen and Webster, 2007; Nordhaus, 2007a; Mendelsohn, 2008; Weyant, 2008).  
Others (Dasgupta, 2007; Weitzman, 2007) have argued that the Stern Review also 
included unusual assumptions about risk aversion. We respond to this observation by 
exploring the relative sensitivity of the SCC to both the pure rate of time preference and 
the rate of risk aversion. Our results support the hypothesis that the assumed rate of risk 
aversion is at least as important as the assumed rate of time preference in determining 
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the social cost of carbon even though our analysis reveals an enormous range of 
estimates. Some are negative (that is, showing social benefits), but our positive 
estimates span six orders of magnitude on the positive side depending on both the pure 
rate of time preference and a standard measure of risk aversion.  
Philosophers would likely confront this range by choosing a particular estimate based 
on what they deemed to be appropriate reflections of both parameters (Broome, 1992; 
Lumer, 2002; Ott, 2003; Beckerman and Hepburn, 2007). This approach was adopted in 
the Stern Review, but here we take a different tact. Instead of imposing our own 
normative values on the selection of a single SCC estimate, we look at the behaviours of 
democratically elected governments to infer distributions of the rates of risk aversion 
and pure time preference that are actually used in practice. We use the resulting 
probability density to constrain the estimates of the SCC and compute its expected 
value. Perhaps surprisingly, the expected social cost of carbon turns out to be reasonably 
close to the value reported in the Stern Review. 
2. Time preference and risk aversion 
To be sure, climate change is a long-term problem. This is why the pure rate of time 
preference is so important. Greenhouse gas emission reduction over the near-term 
would mitigate future damages, but they would do little to alter the present climate 
and/or the present rate of change in climate impacts. The costs of emission abatement 
must therefore be justified by the benefits of avoided impacts in the future. It follows 
that any statement about the desirability of climate policy necessarily contains a value 
judgement about the importance of future gains relative to present sacrifices. The 
discount rate employed in benefit and cost calculations over time can be thought of as 
the opportunity cost of investment, but it can also be seen as the relative value of 
consumption over time. The two are equivalent if the economy is in a dynamic 
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equilibrium; and this equivalence means that time preference is not alone in playing a 
critical role in determining any SCC estimate.  
To explain why, we note that people discount future consumption for two reasons. 
Firstly, they expect to become richer in the future, and so they care less about an 
additional dollar then than they do about an additional dollar today. Secondly, they are 
impatient. We also recall the so-called Ramsey discount rate r  that was designed to 
sustain optimal saving over time (Ramsey, 1928). It consists of three components: 
 r g    (3.1) 
where   is the rate of pure time preference, g  is the growth rate of per capita 
consumption, and   is the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption.  
Both motives of personal discounting can be detected in the Ramsey rule for dynamic 
optimality by considering the rate at which people would be willing to sacrifice a dollar 
of current consumption for additional consumption in the future (see the appendix for 
brief details). The pure rate of time preference is defined implicitly by the marginal rate 
of substitution between present and future consumption under the condition that 
consumption levels in both periods are equal (so that 0g  ). In words, the definition of 
the pure rate of time preference calibrates inter-temporal trading so that individuals who 
anticipate constant levels of consumption from one period to the next would be willing 
to sacrifice one dollar of present consumption if he or she would be compensated with 
 $ 1   of extra consumption in the next period. Higher values of   therefore reflect 
higher degrees of impatience because higher compensation would be required to 
compensate exactly for the loss of $1 in current consumption. 
Consumption levels need not be constant over time, and the second term in (3.1) works 
the implication of this fact into this trading calculus. While g  measures the growth rate 
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of material consumption, g  reflects the growth rate of happiness measured in terms of 
underlying personal utility. If consumption were to climb by 100%g   from one period 
to the next, then each future dollar would be worth 100%g    less (assuming no 
impatience so 0  ). It follows that our individual would consider sacrificing one 
dollar in current consumption only if he or she could be compensated by an amount 
equal to  $ 1 g  in the future.  
In contemplating welfare-based equivalence of consumption over time, it is now clear 
that this trading-based accommodation of growing consumption works in exactly the 
same way as the pure rate of time preference in defining the rate at which the future 
needs to be discounted. Put another way, if one considered empirical estimates for both 
  and   that range from zero to three,13 then both parameters should play equally 
important roles in determining the appropriate discount rate. Perhaps because 
“impatience” is intuitively clear while the role of the “elasticity of marginal utility with 
respect to consumption” is not, the debate over how the SCC could be so high has 
focused undue attention over   almost to the exclusion of  . 
This need not be the case; indeed, the utility-based association with the Ramsey 
discounting rule shows that this should not be the case. Climate change is not only a 
long-term problem; it is also a very uncertain problem and a problem that differentially 
affects people with widely different incomes. The rate of pure time preference   speaks 
only to the first characteristic of the climate policy problem – the time scale issue. The 
elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption, the parameter  , speaks to all 
three characteristics. It is, first of all, a measure of the curvature of the utility function, 
which maps material consumption to happiness. It indicates precisely the degree to 
                                                 
13
 Strictly,   ranges between 0 and 3 per cent per year, while  , as a ratio of percentage changes, is 
unitless. 
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which an additional dollar brings less joy as income increases. Moreover, the parameter 
  can also be interpreted as a measure of how one evaluates a gain of a dollar for rich 
person relative to a gain of a dollar for a poor person. This is why   is occasionally 
referred to as the parameter of inequity aversion. In its simplest form, equity-weighted 











  (3.2) 
where wD  is the globally aggregate impact, cD  is the monetary impact of climate 
change in country c , wy  is globally average per capita income, and cy  is per capita 
income in country c . If 0  , the global impact is the unweighted sum of national 
impacts but if 0  , the impact of climate change on poor countries (relative to the 
world average) receive a greater weight than impacts on rich countries. 
At the same time, curvature in the utility function can be viewed as a reflection of risk 
aversion. In this role,   explains why risk-averse people buy insurance; they are willing 
to pay a premium that is proportional in first order approximation to the parameter   to 
eliminate variability in outcomes because doing so increases their expected utility.
14
 
Note that   also affects the value one attaches to the impacts of climate change, but we 
abstract from this in our discussion. 
3. Estimating the social cost of carbon 
Armed with these insights from the first principles of microeconomic theory, we used 
the integrated assessment model FUND to test the hypothesis that   could actually turn 
                                                 
14
 The risk premium is, by definition, the difference between the expected outcome of a risky situation 
and the “certainty equivalent” outcome – the guaranteed outcome that would sustain a level of utility 
equal to expected utility across the full range of possible outcomes. For a risk averse individual, the 
certainty equivalent is always less than the mean because losses relative to the mean reduce utility more 
than equal gains above the mean.  
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out to be more important in determining the SCC than  . In many ways, FUND is a 
standard integrated assessment model (Tol, 1997; 1999; Guo et al., 2006; Tol, 2006b). 
It has simple representations of the demography, economy, energy, emissions, and 
emission reduction policies for 16 regions. It has simple representations of the cycles of 
greenhouse gases, radiative forcing, climate, and sea level rise. In other ways, though, 
FUND is unique. It is alone in the detail of its representation of the impacts of climate 
change. Impacts on agriculture, forestry, water use, energy use, the coastal zone, 
hurricanes, ecosystems, and health are all modelled separately – both in “physical” units 
and their monetary value (Tol, 2002a; b). Moreover, FUND allows vulnerability to 
climate change impacts to be an explicit function of the level and rate of regional 
development (Tol, 2005a; Tol et al., 2007). See the SOM for more details on the model.  
We estimated the SCC cost of carbon by computing the total, monetised impact of 
climate change along a business as usual path and along a path with slightly higher 
emissions between 2005 and 2014.
15
 Differences in impacts were calculated, discounted 
back to the current year, and normalised by the difference in emissions.
16
 The SCC is 
thereby expressed in dollars per tonne of carbon at a point in time – the standard 
measure of how much future damage would be avoided if today‟s emissions were 
reduced by one tonne. More details on FUND are provided in the SOM.
17
 
We estimated the SCC for a range of values for   and  , but we report our results in 
stages to highlight the triple role of  . We first consider results for cases in which   
affected only the discount rate. That is, we pretended that uncertainty about climate 
change had been resolved and that income differences between countries were 
                                                 
15
 The social cost of carbon of emissions in future or past periods is beyond the scope of this paper. 
16
 We abstained from levelizing the incremental impacts within the period 2005-14 because the numerical 
effect of this correction is minimal while it is hard to explain. 
17
 Full documentation of the FUND model, including the assumptions in the Monte Carlo analysis, is 
available at http://www.fund-model.org. 
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irrelevant. The second set of results put uncertainty back into the problem; the reported 
expected values of the SCC are the product of a Monte Carlo analysis of all the 
uncertain parameters in the FUND model. A third batch of results were drawn from the 
original world of perfect climate certainty, but social cost estimates applied equity 
weighting to the regional impacts of climate change. Finally, we report expected social 
cost estimates for cases in which both uncertainty and equity-weighing play a role – the 
cases where   plays its theoretically appropriate triple role.18 
Based on first principles, we expected that the SCC would react as follows to parameter 
changes. The higher the pure rate of time preference,  , the less one cares about the 
future. Damages from climate change, as they occur over time, are therefore less of 
problem and the SCC should fall. Similarly, the higher risk aversion,  , the higher the 
discount rate in a scenario of growing per capita income and so the SCC should again 
fall. However, higher aversion to risk means that one is more concerned about 
uncertainty and particularly concerned about negative surprises; as a result, the SCC 
should rise with higher values of  . Furthermore, the higher aversion to risk also 
corresponds to greater concern about income distribution; if one assumes that climate 
change disproportionally affects the poor, then the SCC should again rise. Based on first 
principles, therefore, we can predict the effect of changes in time preference  , but the 
effect of risk aversion   is ambiguous. 
4. Results 
Figure 13 shows the SCC cost of carbon for the four cases, varying both   and   while 
Figure 14 portrays various cross-sections. If we ignore concerns about equity and 
                                                 
18
 Note that we assume that the scenarios of population, economy, energy and emissions are independent 
of   and  . Implicitly, we thus assume that changes in   and   are exactly offset by changes in the 
scenario of technological change. 
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uncertainty (Panel A), the SCC roughly decreases with the discount rate. For 0   , 
SCC = $1,939/tC; it falls to SCC = $10/tC for 1    and to SCC = -$5/tC for 
2   . The sign changes because climate change is initially beneficial to the world 
economy. For 3   , however, SCC climbs back to -$4/tC because the discount rate 
is so high that it even discounts initial benefits significantly. 
The profiles change when uncertainty is taken into account. Panel B shows that a 
maximum is still observed where 0    and the expected social cost of carbon, 
denoted E(SCC) equals $2,036/tC. This is a local maximum, though. E(SCC) falls 
monotonically as   increases. E(SCC) also falls initially as   (and thus the discount 
rate) increases, but it starts rising as a greater   values puts more emphasis on the tail of 
the distribution. For 0   and 3  , E(SCC) = $152,155/tC. E(SCC) is negative only 
for 2.7%   and 1.10 2.25  . 
Panel C shows that the results are different again with equity weighing (Azar and 
Sterner, 1996; Fankhauser et al., 1997) and no uncertainty. For 0   , SCC = 
$1,939/tC; since 0   implies equal weights, this is the global maximum. A local 
maximum appears at SCC = $122/tC when 0   and 3  . Since this maximum is 
smaller than the expected social cost reported above for the second set of values for 
0  , 3  , we see that uncertainty is a bigger concern for climate policy than equity, 
at least in terms of an aggregate measure like the SCC. A global minimum is observed 
when 3    and SCC = -$50/tC. It emerges because CO2 fertilization brings short-
term benefits even to poor countries that will be hurt by climate change in the longer 
term. For these parameters, long-term losses are heavily discounted and short-term 
benefits in developing countries are emphasized. See the appendix for the case without 
CO2 fertilization. 
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Estimates of expected social cost are similar when equity weighting is added to the 
complication of uncertainty. Panel D has a local a maximum at 0    as before 
where E(SCC) = $2,036/tC, but the global maximum is E(SCC) = $120,977/tC at 0 
, 3  . E(SCC) is lowest for a high   and a medium  ; E(SCC) = $9/tC, for example, 
at 3.0%  , 0.90  . Note that the E(SCC) is strictly positive for this, the 
theoretically correct scenario. 
For reference, Lord Stern of Brentford chose 0.1%  , 1  ; in our calibration 
through FUND, the result was E(SCC) = $721/tC. Since the Stern Review essentially 
ignored equity weighing, though, E(SCC) = $333/tC is a more comparable statistic. The 
Stern Review estimate E(SCC) = $314/tC, which is remarkable close. However, note 
that the Review used the PAGE (Hope, 2008) model – which truncates the tails of 
distributions of input parameters that FUND fully recognizes
19
, but keeps vulnerability 
to climate change as in 1995 while FUND has vulnerability declining with development 
– the two main differences between the two models roughly offset one another. 
5. Choosing a social cost of carbon 
We used two different approaches to inform our representations of combinations   and 
  that reflect actual practice across decision-makers. In the first, we worked with 
results from Evans and Sezer (2004; 2005), who estimated 1.49  , with a standard 
deviation of 0.19 for 22 rich and democratic countries from income redistribution data 
(Stern, 1977). They also independently estimated 1.08 0.20   %/year using data on 
mortality rates. Assuming normality, these results support the probability density 
function on   and   displayed in Panel A of Figure 15. The first row of Table 5 
                                                 
19
 Note that we discard the top and bottom .1% of Monte Carlo results because these outliers have an 
undue impact on the mean. 
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records estimates of the expected value of the SCC derived from this distribution for the 
four cases described above (see the appendix for details). Ignoring concerns about 
equity and uncertainty, E(SCC) = -$1/tC. Considering either equity or uncertainty alone 
increases the estimate to $13/tC or $62/tC, respectively. Uncertainty is again seen to 
play a larger role in determining the social cost of carbon than equity. Considering both 
equity and uncertainty produces the fourth estimate: E(SCC) = $210/tC. Equity and 
uncertainty reinforce one another. 
Our second approach relied data on per capita consumption growth rates, inflation rates, 
and nominal interest rates for 27 OECD countries from 1970 to 2006. We interpreted 
observations of the real interest rate (r in (3.1) and the difference between the nominal 
rate and the rate of inflation) and the growth rate g  as drawings from a bi-variate 
normal distribution. The Ramsey equation implies that realisations for r  and g  
together support a linear combination for   and  . As a result, the bi-variate 
distribution for r  and g  implies a degenerate bi-variate distribution for   and  . 
Panel B of Figure 15 displays this distribution. The mean for   is 1.18, with a standard 
deviation of 0.80, but the distribution is right skewed with a mode of 0.55  . The 
mean of   is 1.4%, with a standard deviation of 0.9%; the distribution is again right-
skewed, this time with a mode of 0.9%  . The characteristics of this distribution are 
not inconsistent with the underlying distributions reported by Evans and Sezer, but it 
does clearly differ in shape. The second row of Table 5 shows the sensitivity of E(SCC) 
estimates to the difference. Ignoring uncertainty and equity, E(SCC) = $41/tC; it is 
much higher than the estimate reported in the first row from the Evans and Sezer 
distribution because lower values of   and   are deemed more likely. As before, 
considering either equity or uncertainty increases the E(SCC), this time to $59/tC and 
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$117/tC, respectively. The effects of equity and uncertainty are now less pronounced 
because extreme values of   and   receive lower probability mass than before. 
Finally, as before, uncertainty dominates equity. However, in this case, equity 
moderates uncertainty; considering both simultaneously produces an estimate for 
E(SCC) of $228/tC. Again, equity and uncertainty reinforce one another. 
The third row of Table 5 shows E(SCC) estimates for a combined probability density 
function of   and   produced by multiplying the two PDFs in Figure 15 and rescaling 
them to integrate to unity. The estimates lie in between the previous results, but closer 
to the initial results derived from the Evans and Sezer PDF. The qualitative pattern is 
the same, though. Uncertainty dominates, and is reinforced by equity. Combining all of 
this information, our final estimate is E(SCC) = $206/tC. 
6. Conclusion 
Lord Stern (Stern, 2007) has expressed a preference for debating philosophically about 
the appropriate discount rate for the benefits of mitigation. We bow out of that debate 
by exploring the ramifications of actual decision makers and actual developed 
economies. We find that aversion to risk is as important in determining SCC estimates 
as time preference. More specifically, we offer high estimates for the SCC given 
operational combinations of risk aversion and time preference even with a model that 
incorporates relatively conservative damage estimates (including benefits early) and 
autonomous adaptation driven by regional economic development.  
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7. Appendix 
7.1. A utility-based rationale for Equation (3.1) 
To uncover the utility-based interpretation of the Ramsey (1928) optimal saving rule, 
consider a two period environment wherein inter-temporal discounted utility is given by 










with tC  indicating consumption in period t  ( 1,2t  ). Totally differentiating this 
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The interpretation in the text – that the Ramsey rule can be interpreted as representing 
the sum of an impatience effect and the effect of diminishing marginal utility with 
increasing consumption – follows. 
7.2. FUND details 
This paper uses version 3.0 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and 
Distribution (FUND). Version 3.0 of FUND corresponds to version 1.6, described and 
applied by Tol (1999; 2001; 2002c), except for the impact module, which is described 
by Tol (2002a; b) and updated by Link and Tol (2006). A full list of papers, the source 
code and the technical documentation with all equations and all parameter values for the 
model can be found on line at http://www.fund-model.org. 
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous 
perturbations. The model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United 
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States of America, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central 
America, South America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa, and Small Island States. The model runs from 1950 to 2300 in time 
steps of one year. The prime reason for starting in 1950 is to initialize the climate 
change impact module. In FUND, the impacts of climate change are assumed to depend 
on the impact of the previous year, this way reflecting the process of adjustment to 
climate change. Because the initial values to be used for the year 1950 cannot be 
approximated very well, both physical and monetized impacts of climate change tend to 





are included to assess the long-term implications of climate change. Previous versions 
of the model stopped at 2200. 
The period of 1950-2000 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the 
IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes and Goldewijk, 1994). The scenario for the period 
2010-2100 is based on the EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in 
between IS92a and IS92f (Leggett et al., 1992). The 2000-2010 period is interpolated 
from the immediate past (http://earthtrends.wri.org), and the period 2100-2300 
extrapolated. 
The scenarios are defined by the rates of population growth, economic growth, 
autonomous energy efficiency improvements as well as the rate of decarbonization of 
the energy use (autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), and emissions of carbon 
dioxide from land use change, methane and nitrous oxide. 
The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact of 
climatic change. Population decreases with increasing climate change related deaths that 
result from changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and tropical cyclones. Heat and 
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cold stress are assumed to have an effect only on the elderly, non-reproductive 
population. In contrast, the other sources of mortality also affect the number of births. 
Heat stress only affects the urban population. The share of the urban population among 
the total population is based on the World Resources Databases 
(http://earthtrends.wri.org). It is extrapolated based on the statistical relationship 
between urbanization and per-capita income, which are estimated from a cross-section 
of countries in 1995. Climate-induced migration between the regions of the world also 
causes the population sizes to change. Immigrants are assumed to assimilate 
immediately and completely with the respective host population. 
The tangible impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy (cf. Fankhauser and Tol, 
2005). Consumption and investment are reduced without changing the savings rate.
20
 As 
a result, climate change reduces long-term economic growth, although consumption is 
particularly affected in the short-term. Economic growth is also reduced by carbon 
dioxide abatement measures. The energy intensity of the economy and the carbon 
intensity of the energy supply autonomously decrease over time. This process can be 
accelerated by abatement policies, an option not considered in this paper. 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur hexafluoride, the global mean temperature, 
the impact of carbon dioxide emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, 
and the impact of the damages to the economy and the population caused by climate 
change. Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the atmosphere, and then 
geometrically depleted. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, measured in 
parts per million by volume, is represented by the five-box model of Maier-Reimer and 
                                                 
20
 The savings rate is exogenous in this paper, given that we do not present results from an intertemporal 
optimization exercise. See Fankhauser and Tol (2005) for an in depth discussion of climate change 
impacts and economic growth models.  
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Hasselmann (1987). Its parameters are taken from Hammitt et al. (1992). The model 
also contains sulphur emissions (Tol, 2006b). 
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride 
and sulphur aerosols is determined based on Ramaswamy et al. (2001). The global 
mean temperature T  is governed by a geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined 
by the radiative forcing RF ), with a half-life of 50 years. In the base case, the global 
mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5°C for a doubling of carbon dioxide 
equivalents. Regional temperature follows from multiplying the global mean 
temperature by a fixed factor, which corresponds to the spatial climate change pattern 
averaged over 14 GCMs (Mendelsohn et al., 2000). The global mean sea level is also 
geometric, with its equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 50 
years. Both temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best guess 
temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996). 
The climate impact module, based on Tol (2002a; b) includes the following categories: 
agriculture, forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to 
cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy 
consumption, water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems. Climate change related 
damages can be attributed to either the rate of change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/yr) or the 
level of change (benchmarked at 1.0°C). Damages from the rate of temperature change 
slowly fade, reflecting adaptation (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
People can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne diseases, or they 
can migrate because of sea level rise. Like all impacts of climate change, these effects 
are monetized. The value of a statistical life is set to be 200 times the annual per capita 
income. The resulting value of a statistical life lies in the middle of the observed range 
of values in the literature (cf. Cline, 1992). The value of emigration is set to be 3 times 
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the per capita income (Tol, 1995b), the value of immigration is 40 per cent of the per 
capita income in the host region (Cline, 1992). Losses of dryland and wetlands due to 
sea level rise are modelled explicitly. The monetary value of a loss of one square 
kilometre of dryland was on average $4 million in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. 
Fankhauser, 1994). Dryland value is assumed to be proportional to GDP per square 
kilometre. Wetland losses are valued at $2 million per square kilometre on average in 
the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). The wetland value is assumed to have 
logistic relation to per capita income. Coastal protection is based on cost-benefit 
analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due to the construction of dikes 
and subsequent coastal squeeze. 
Other impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, water, and ecosystems, 
are directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of impacts 
measured in their „natural‟ units (cf. Tol, 2002a). Impacts of climate change on energy 
consumption, agriculture, and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases explicitly 
recognize that there is a climatic optimum, which is determined by a variety of factors, 
including plant physiology and the behaviour of farmers. Impacts are positive or 
negative depending on whether the actual climate conditions are moving closer to or 
away from that optimum climate. Impacts are larger if the initial climate conditions are 
further away from the optimum climate. The optimum climate is of importance with 
regard to the potential impacts. The actual impacts lag behind the potential impacts, 
depending on the speed of adaptation. The impacts of not being fully adapted to new 
climate conditions are always negative (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
The impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged ecosystems, water 
resources, diarrhoea malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are modelled as simple 
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power functions. Impacts are either negative or positive, and they do not change sign 
(cf. Tol, 2002b).  
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and 
technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as 
water resources (with population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbanization), 
and ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes). Other systems are 
projected to become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with technological 
progress), agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and water-borne diseases 
(with improved health care) (cf. Tol, 2002b). The income elasticities in Tol (2002b) are 
estimated with cross- sectional data. 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is estimated by running the model twice, perturbed and 
unperturbed. In the perturbed run, an additional one million metric tonnes of carbon are 
emitted in each year between 2005 and 2015. The difference in impacts is computed and 
discounted back to the year 2005, using the discount rate as specified in Equation (3.4). 



























   
    







- rSCC  is the regional social cost of carbon (in 1995 US dollar per tonne of 
carbon); 
- r  denotes region; 
- t  and s  denote time (in years); 
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- I  are monetised impacts (in 1995 US dollar per year); 
- E  are emissions (in metric tonnes of carbon); 
-   are additional emissions (in metric tonnes of carbon); 
-   is the pure rate of time preference (in fraction per year); 
-   is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption; and 
- g  is the growth rate of per capita consumption (in fraction per year). 














   
 
  (3.6) 
where 
- SCC  is the global social cost of carbon (in 1995 US dollar per tonne of carbon); 
- rSCC  is the regional social cost of carbon (in 1995 US dollar per tonne of 
carbon); 
- r  denotes region; 
- worldY  is the global average per capita consumption (in 1995 US dollar per person 
per year); 
- rY  is the regional average per capita consumption (in 1995 US dollar per person 
per year); and 
-   is the rate of inequity aversion; 0   in the case without equity weighing; 
   in the case with equity weighing. 













   (3.7) 
where 
-  E SCC  is the expected value of the social cost of carbon (in US dollar per 
tonne of carbon); 
- i  indexes the Monte Carlo run; 
- MC  is the number of Monte Carlo runs; 1000MC  ; and 
-   is the vector of uncertain input parameters, fully specified on 
http://www.fund-model.org/ 
7.3. The rate of risk aversion, the pure rate of time preference, and the discount rate 
We compute the SCC  and the  E SCC  for a range of the pure rate of time preference (
 ) and the rate of risk aversion ( ), and we also compute a weighted average using 
three alternative bivariate PDFs for   and  , as follows: 
 * ( , ) ( , )d dSCC SCC f     
 
    (3.8) 
The first bi-variate PDF of   and   assumes that these parameters are normally 
distributed with 1.08%  , 1.49  , 0.20%  , 0.19   and 0  . See 
Table 6. The second bi-variate PDF is degenerate. It corresponds to a bi-variate normal 
PDF of r  and g  with 3.45%r  , 2.70g  , 2.56%r  , 1.61g   and 0rg   (see 
Table 7) and r g   . The third bi-variate PDF is the convolution of the first two. 
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7.4. The impact of CO2 fertilization on the social cost of carbon 
In the main text, we find that social cost of carbon is positive for a high value of   if 
equity weighing is included and uncertainty is not. We assert that this is because of CO2 
fertilization of agriculture, which has large benefits in developing countries in the short 
term. High values of   emphasize these benefits. In order to test this assertion, we reran 
the model with the CO2 fertilization switched off. Figure 16 compares the results. With 
CO2 fertilization, the SCC falls with rising  . Without CO2 fertilization, the SCC first 
falls (as the discount rate increases) but then starts rising (as the rising discount rate is 











Figure 13: The marginal damage cost of carbon emissions as a function of the rate of 
time preference and the rate of risk aversion. 
 
Panel A (top left) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates without equity weighting and 
without uncertainty; low pure rates of time preference and risk aversion produce high 
SCC estimates because they work exclusively through the discount rate. Panel B (top 
right) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates to uncertainty without equity weighting; 
low rates of time preference produce higher estimates, but uncertainty dominates 
especially for high levels of risk aversion where the associated risk premium climbs 
enormously. Panel C ( bottom left) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates to equity 
weighting derived from the “inequity aversion) interpretation of   and without 
uncertainty; higher aversions to inequity reduce the SCC for any time preference 
because the positive gains in developing countries from CO2 fertilization dominate 
“downstream” losses that are, by virtue of the higher values for  , discounted more 
severely. Panel D (bottom right) shows the sensitivity of SCC estimates to equity 
weighting with uncertainty fully represented; the moderating effect of higher values for 
















































































































































Figure 14: The SCC as a function of the rate of time preference (green diamonds for a 
rate of risk aversion of 1.0), the rate of risk aversion (red squares for a rate of time 
preference of 2.0), and of the rate to time preference (blue triangles for a rate of risk 
aversion adjusted to maintain the discount rate at 5.0 assuming that consumption grows 
at 2.0% per year – right axis) 
 
Panel A (top left) shows contours without equity weighting and without uncertainty. 
Negative values for SCC are possible for high rates of risk aversion and/or time 
preference (and guaranteed for a 5% discount rate); this is an indication of the 
conservative damage estimates embodied in FUND. Panel B (top right) displays 
contours with   working as a risk aversion parameter given complete manifestation of 
uncertainty but ignoring its role as equity weighting parameter at any point in time; the 
U-shaped contour associated with risk aversion is particularly instructive – the 
discounting effect of high values is dominated by the risk-premium effect of increased 
aversion to risk. Panel C (bottom left) shows contours with   working to produce 
equity weights without uncertainty; the early agricultural benefits of CO2 fertilization in 
developing countries produces negative estimates for SCC for high discount rates born 
of high rates of risk aversion and/or time preference. Panel D (bottom right) allows   to 
work both as a source of equity weighting and as a measure of risk aversion given 
climate and socio-economic uncertainty; the U-shaped contours of the uncertainty only 


































































































Figure 15: Probability density functions of risk aversion and time preference 
 
Panel A displays the distribution reported by Evans and Sezer. Panel B was derived 




























































































Figure 16: The SCC as a function of the rate of time preference (green diamonds for a 
rate of risk aversion of 1.0), the rate of risk aversion (red squares for a rate of time 
preference of 2.0), and of the rate to time preference (blue triangles for a rate of risk 
aversion adjusted to maintain the discount rate at 5.0 assuming that consumption grows 
at 2.0% per year) 
 
Both panels show contours with equity weights but without uncertainty. Panel A 
includes the immediate, positive effects of CO2 fertilization on agriculture across the 
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   g  a  b  
Australia* 1.5 1.9 1.4 1.7 
Austria 1.0 2.7 1.6 1.6 
Belgium 1.0 2.3 1.5 1.6 
Czech Rep 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.4 
Denmark 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.3 
Finland 1.0 2.2 1.6 1.6 
France 0.9 1.8 1.3 1.3 
Germany 1.0 2.2 1.6 1.5 
Greece 1.0 2.5 1.7 1.5 
Hungary 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.4 
Ireland 0.8 3.0 1.6 2.0 
Italy 1.0 2.5 1.5 1.4 
Japan* 1.5 2.5 1.4 1.4 
Luxembourg 0.9 2.5 1.8 1.8 
The Netherlands 0.9 1.8 1.5 1.6 
Poland 1.0 4.6 1.1 1.1 
Portugal 1.0 2.7 1.6 1.7 
Slovakia 1.1 3.7 1.6 1.5 
Spain 1.0 2.3 1.6 1.6 
Sweden 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.4 
UK 1.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 
USA* 1.5 2.2 1.3 1.4 
     
Mean 1.08 2.30 1.46 1.51 
St dev 0.20 0.79 0.19 0.19 
Table 6: Data on the rates of pure time preference and risk aversion 
 
a
 Risk aversion evaluated at the average wage. 
b
 Average risk aversion evaluated at a range of wages. 










 Corr N Year 
 mean St dev Mean St dev   first last 
Australia 2.42 0.88 3.25 3.63 0.28 30 1971 2005 
Austria 1.99 0.99 3.54 1.22 0.19 16 1990 2006 
Belgium 2.44 1.47 3.85 2.42 -0.29 33 1970 2005 
Canada 2.48 1.41 3.56 2.58 0.08 32 1970 2005 
Czech Rep 4.45 1.68 2.45 1.06 -0.08 5 2001 2005 
Denmark 1.90 1.30 4.16 1.91 0.09 18 1988 2006 
Finland 3.58 1.33 4.60 1.96 0.32 14 1988 2005 
France 2.17 1.37 3.58 2.10 -0.21 34 1970 2005 
Germany 2.46 1.28 3.86 1.25 -0.01 32 1970 2006 
Greece 3.86 0.51 1.86 1.32 -0.20 9 1998 2006 
Iceland 4.03 1.57 5.65 1.60 0.09 9 1995 2005 
Ireland 4.80 2.68 3.25 3.40 0.21 28 1976 2005 
Italy 1.57 0.98 3.90 2.03 0.31 12 1993 2006 
Japan 1.98 1.25 2.60 0.87 0.03 13 1989 2005 
Korea 4.39 1.36 2.30 1.11 -0.24 5 2001 2005 
Luxembourg 3.69 2.23 2.83 1.78 0.03 11 1995 2005 
Netherlands 2.46 1.09 3.51 2.20 -0.23 32 1970 2006 
New Zealand 2.46 1.59 2.67 3.88 -0.20 26 1970 2005 
Norway 2.39 1.33 4.86 1.65 0.20 20 1985 2005 
Poland 4.17 1.84 4.47 1.11 -0.51 5 2001 2005 
Portugal 2.35 1.65 3.07 2.12 0.73 11 1994 2005 
Slovak Rep 5.55 1.67 -0.15 2.94 -0.23 5 2001 2005 
Spain 2.63 1.33 3.84 2.46 0.32 25 1981 2006 
Sweden 2.61 1.25 5.00 1.79 -0.10 16 1987 2005 
Switzerland 1.87 1.13 1.50 1.66 -0.04 27 1970 2005 
UK 2.82 1.20 3.22 3.72 -0.02 30 1970 2005 
USA 2.76 1.27 3.28 2.39 0.18 30 1970 2005 
         
Total 2.70 1.61 3.45 2.56 0.01 528 1970 2006 
Table 7: Data on the growth rate of per capita income and the real rate of interest 
 
a
 Gross domestic product (expenditure approach) per capita in constant prices. 
b
 Long-term interest rate minus the percentage change in the consumer price index (all 
items). 
Source: OECD.Stat Monthly Economic Indicators (http://stats.oecd.org) 
 





IV On International Equity Weights and National 
Decision Making on Climate Change 
1. Introduction 
Equity weights, in one form or other, are now frequently used to aggregate the 
monetized impacts of climate change that would befall different countries (Azar and 
Sterner, 1996; Fankhauser et al., 1997; Azar, 1999; Tol, 1999; Pearce, 2003; Anthoff et 
al., 2009). Equity weights reflect that a dollar to a poor person is not the same as a 
dollar to a rich person. That is, one cannot add up monetized welfare losses across 
disparate incomes. Instead, one should add up welfare losses and then monetize. Equity 
weighting does just that, albeit with a linear approximation. 
The aggregation of welfare losses to different countries assumes a supranational 
perspective. Indeed, the formal derivation of equity weights presumes a global social 
planner. As an academic exercise, this is fine. However, equity-weighted worldwide 
marginal damage cost estimates for carbon dioxide are also used by the European 
Commission and the UK Government in their cost-benefit analysis of domestic policies 
(Clarkson and Deyes, 2002; Commission of the European Communities, 2005). 
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This is peculiar. Within countries, equity weights are shunned. Instead, the welfare loss 
of some average person is used.
21
 This is because the democratic principle of “one 
person, one vote” sits awkwardly with the notion that some people are worthier than 
others. Between countries, matters are different, as the world is made up of sovereign 
nations. 
One can, of course, argue that as a matter of principle one should act on the basis of 
how the world ought to be, not how the world is. If one then further believes that 
democracy is good, then one would probably argue for using the global average welfare 
loss to guide climate policy. Combined with the assumption that willingness to pay for 
climate change impacts varies linearly with per capita income, certain equity weights 
are indeed equivalent to global average values (see below). These are many ifs. 
The UK Government and the European Commission, however, answer to the people of 
the UK and (ultimately) the EU, respectively, not to the people of the world. Using 
equity weights for impacts of climate change, impacts in Africa, say, are valued higher 
than the average African would; while impacts in Europe are valued lower than the 
average European would. At the same time, in Europe, health impacts, say, due to 
climate change are valued less than health impacts due to air pollution, say. This is most 
peculiar. Pretending to be the world government, the UK Government and the European 
Commission short-change the people they actually represent. And, the application of 
monetization and cost-benefit techniques introduces inconsistencies. 
This of course is the consequence of using equity weights only for specific policy areas, 
i.e. climate change, which is wrong from a theoretical point of view. Equity weights are 
an all-or-nothing thing: Once a decision-maker opts to use equity weights, she has to 
                                                 
21
 Note that, although every citizen is in principle considered equally worthy regardless of their income, 
poorer areas are often dirtier (Brown, 1995). 
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use equity weights for all her decision-making procedures, otherwise inconsistencies 
between various policy arenas will arise. If the UK opted to use equity weights for all its 
cost-benefit analysis, no such problems would arise. While in theory it is clear how 
equity weights should be used by a national decision maker without introducing 
inconsistencies in its decision making process, these guidelines are not followed in 
practise. Equity weights are used in the context of climate change by the UK 
government and the EU, but not for other policy areas. The resulting inconsistencies are 
grave and cannot be justified by any known theoretical argument. 
Instead, in the absence of international cooperation, a national government committed to 
climate policy and cost-benefit analysis has five options. First, a country could ignore 
impacts outside its territory. Second, a country could care about foreign impacts to the 
extent that its citizens care about foreigners. These two options are numerically close; 
and they reflect tough realpolitik. Third, a country could argue that it has the duty to 
protect foreigners to the same extent as it does its own citizens. This is common practice 
for health and safety: Foreign visitors and resident enjoy the same level of protection as 
do citizens. Here, foreign impacts would be valued the same as domestic impacts. 
Fourth, a country could argue that it has the duty to be a good neighbour
22
 and prevent 
damage to others and, failing that, feel guilty about the welfare loss it caused abroad. 
Fifth, a country could offer compensation for the damages it caused abroad, because it 
feels morally obliged to do so; or because it is told to by a court. Compensation 
presumably equals the damage done, and foreign impacts would be assessed with 
foreign values. We argue below that option 3 and 4 are identical under certain 
conditions. This paper therefore presents four alternative estimates of the marginal 
damage costs estimates for various world regions – and we compare these four 
                                                 
22
 Climate change is a global phenomenon, so all are neighbours. 
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alternatives to two estimates that are commonly used. We show that the different 
estimates differ not only in the values assigned to impacts abroad, but also in the 
discount rate used. 
The central metric in the paper is the social cost of carbon. The social cost of carbon if 
often thought of as the net present value of the additional damage done by an 
infinitesimally small increase in emissions, and thus equals the Pigou tax along an 
efficient emissions trajectory. However, the social cost of carbon can also be thought of 
as society‟s willingness to pay (at the margin) for greenhouse gas emission reduction. 
We use the latter interpretation in the current paper, and show how the social cost of 
carbon varies with different positions on damage done to others. As a corollary, our 
social cost of carbon differs between countries – even if countries agree on the ethical 
principles that underlie the social cost of carbon. Our social cost of carbon then also 
obviously differs from the Pigou tax, and it is in fact lower in many cases. 
Section 2 formalizes the above discussion and reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 
presents the numerical model used for estimating marginal damage costs. Section 4 
shows the results. Section 5 discusses and concludes. 
2. Equity weighting 
2.1. Previous work 














  (4.1) 
Where iD  is the damage in country i , 1,2,...,i N ; U  is the utility function of country 
i , and CU  is its first partial derivative of utility to average per capita consumption C ; 
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W  is the global welfare function, and UW  is its first partial derivative to utility; MW  is a 
normalization constant to go back from welfare to money – MW  is the first partial 
derivative to average per capita consumption, evaluated at the optimal point; WD  is the 
global damage. Equation (4.1) holds for any welfare and utility function, but in their 
numerical results Fankhauser et al. (1997) only consider constant rate of risk aversion 
(CRRA) utility functions and generalised utilitarian (e.g. Atkinson, 1970) welfare 
functions. 
The normalization constant has an element of arbitrariness. In this case, the anchor point 
is a world that is fair (according to the welfare function), and the damage is spread in an 
equitable manner. If the anchor point were an unfair world because of reasons other 
than climate change, the valuation of climate change would reflect such inequities – and 
we may end up using greenhouse gas emission reduction to rectify other wrongs than 
climate change. In this sense, the chosen normalisation reflects first-best policy. 






  and a CRRA utility function, 















  (4.2) 
where WC  is the world average per capita consumption, and   is the elasticity of 
marginal utility with respect to income. In our model   is a parameter of inter- and 
intratemporal inequality aversion.
23
 Clearly, countries with an income above (below) the 
world average receive a low (high) weight, and this is more pronounced as the utility 
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 In probabilistic models   is also the parameter of risk aversion, but we restrict our analysis in this 
paper to a deterministic case. For a discussion of this triple role of ε in the climate change economics 
debate see Beckerman and Hepburn (2007).  
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Equations (4.1) and (4.2) were used in previous work (Fankhauser et al., 1997). We 
now reconstruct (4.1) and (4.2) for a national decision maker. 
2.2. Welfare functions 












This is a conventional CRRA utility function. 
We further assume that the national policy maker optimises a welfare function that is 
defined over the utility of individuals. In particular, we look at welfare functions that 
take the sum of individual utilities. This utilitarian assumption is disputable, but it is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we focus on variations of utilitarian welfare and 
the consequences for the social cost of carbon. Each represents a specific policy position 
of a national decision maker. 
2.2.a. Impacts abroad are ignored 
If a national planner is indifferent to what happens abroad, the welfare function is 
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   (4.4) 
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 Climate change damages are typically approximated by the direct costs (that is price times quantity) 
with constant prices. If the “price”, or rather unit value, varies with an income elasticity of willingness to 
pay of  , then we have that  
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     
where 
c
I  is the impact in country c , 
0
V  is its unit value, and 
W
V  is the world average value. Under these 
assumptions, all impacts are effectively valued the same – and at the world average. Note that that the rate 
of inequity aversion and the income elasticity of willingness to pay are the same by chance only – even 
though both are set equal to unity in many applied papers. 
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where 
,t iC  is consumption of agent i  at time t , T  is the end of the time horizon the 
policy maker is taking into account, tN  is the population size at time t  and   is the 
pure rate of time preference. 
In practise, policy makers do not have data on an individual basis. We therefore use a 
welfare function based on average per capita consumption: 







w C u C P  

   (4.5) 
where 
tC  is average per capita consumption at time t  in the region of the policy maker 
and tP  is the population size of the region at time t .
25
 We omit the average bars from 
here on. 
The social cost of carbon (SCC), or marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide emissions, 
is defined as the damage done by a small change in emissions E  today ( 0t  ). In utils, 
we take the utility effect of a marginal change in consumption caused by climate 



















  (4.6) 
In money, the corresponding SCC figure is 
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25
 Note that using average per capita consumption in this way introduces a small upwards bias in total 
welfare. See Anthoff et al. (2009) for a numerical analysis of this issue. 
26
 For a discussion of discounting of non-marginal climate change impacts see Dietz (2006).  
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2.2.b. Impacts abroad reduce domestic welfare 
If the social planner is altruistic towards people abroad, the welfare function is 
      1 * 1, , ,
0 0 1
, (1 ) (1 )
T T N
a
t t i t t t i t i
t t i
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   
      
   
   (4.8) 
Here ,t iC  is average per capita consumption in country i  at time t ; N  is the number of 
countries; *u  specifies the foreign utility function of the domestic planner; it may be a 
scaled transformation of u , that is 
*u u  with 0 1  . That is, the preferences of 
other agents are identical to one‟s own, but less important.  
The corresponding scc  (in utils) follows as 
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If *u  is proportional to u , the corresponding regional SCC (in money) is 
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(4.10) 
where ,t ig  is the average annual growth rate of per capita consumption between now 
and year t  in region i . 
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 Note that we do not assume a constant growth rate; rather 
t
g  is the geometric mean growth rate of the 
yearly growth rates between time 0 and t  predicted by the model. 
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For 0  , this reduces to (4.7). 
2.2.c. Good neighbour 
It is well established, both morally and legally, that one should not do damage to others, 
or compensate them if damage is done nonetheless. Here we assume that compensation 
is not possible. Compensation is dealt with below. 
If the obligation not to do damage is interpreted as a hard constraint, the implications 
are simple: One should reduce greenhouse gas emissions to zero. Here we instead 
assume that the domestic policy maker takes welfare losses abroad caused by herself 
into account. 
Note that good neighbourliness is not the same as altruism. An altruistic agent cares 
about other agents. A good neighbour only cares about her impact on other agents. An 
altruistic agent cares about the impacts of climate change on others and about income 
differences in general. A good neighbour cares about the impacts of climate caused by 
herself only. An altruistic agent would seek to minimise her impacts on others, and 
would donate money to less fortunate people. A good neighbour would seek to 
minimise her impacts on others. Altruism may evolve if survival and procreation are 
enhanced by the well-being of others. These others are probably a small group of close 
relatives. Good neighbourliness may evolve if survival and procreation would be 
reduced by the wrath of others. We do not present an evolutionary game, however, but 
simply assume that good neighbourliness is in the welfare function. 
This may be specified as 
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where Δu is the damage done abroad by domestic action, expressed as a reduction in 
welfare abroad. 
We again assume that the domestic agent uses the same utility function for other agents 
as for herself, an assumption that keeps the model simple. Besides, different utility 
functions for different agents would be hard to justify too. The scc  is then 
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In money, this becomes 
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Note that (4.13) equals (4.10) for 1  . However, there is a conceptual difference 
between altruism and good neighbourliness. The policy implications are different as 
well. An altruistic agent would donate money to less well-to-do people or, if that is not 
possible, would use climate policy to right other wrongs. A good neighbour would not 
donate money and would reduce emissions for climate change only. 
Note that although all foreign parties are treated the same in Equation (4.11), Equation 
(4.13) gives preferential treatment to the poorer parties. 
Note further that, if the income elasticity of the willingness to pay for climate change 
impacts equals the rate of inequality aversion, then Equation (4.13) is equivalent to 
assuming that impacts abroad are valued at domestic prices (cf. footnote 24). This is an 
alternative interpretation of good neighbourliness: One treats impacts on others as if 
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they fell on oneself. Recall, however, that this interpretation is valid only under the 
restrictive and improbable assumption that the income elasticity and inequality aversion 
are numerically equal. 
Equation (4.13) shows how concern for foreign parties would affect the willingness to 
pay for domestic greenhouse gas emission reduction. Climate change would also affect 
biodiversity. Equation (4.13) thus also quantifies the concern for other species. 
However, while polar bears (say) do not care for monetary compensation, foreign 
people would. The next subsection therefore turns to this question. 
2.2.d. Impacts abroad are compensated 
One can imagine a situation in which climate change damages are fully internalized, i.e. 
the emitter of greenhouse gas emissions fully compensates those that suffer damages. In 
particular, one can imagine a set of international treaties which puts the obligation to 
pay compensation for damages caused to every nation. We are not particularly 
concerned in this paper how or whether such a situation could arise. We merely assume 
that there is some external forcing or reasoning due to which compensation is paid. This 
is not the same as good-neighbour-with-compensation, as that would have 
compensation as a decision variable.
28
 The important point is that compensation 
payments are not happening because there is a desire to do so; rather there is an 
obligation. 
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 Note that the solution would lie somewhere in between the good-neighbour-without-compensation case 
derived above and the full-compensation case derived below. 
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Where L  is the total compensation paid to country i  and *L  is the compensation 
received. 
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Note that the compensation is discounted with the social discount rate based on the 
domestic growth rate. This follows because the welfare loss is a domestic loss through 
compensation. Intuitively, the damage abroad is paid for by the domestic consumers and 
should therefore be discounted using their discount rate. 
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There are two differences between (4.14) and (4.17). Firstly, damage abroad has an 
equity weight in (4.14) but not in (4.17). Secondly, damage abroad is discounted with 
the discount factor abroad in (4.14), but with the domestic discount rate in (4.17). 
2.2.e. Overview 
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 Equation (4.17) follows from (4.16) by equating the term for paid compensation with the term of 
damage caused, i.e. replacing , 0t iL E  with , 0t iC E  . 
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The alternative positions follow from the appropriate choices for  , the equity weight 
 , and the discount factor DF . See Table 8. For completeness, Table 8 also includes 
the cooperative solution – in which the regions jointly maximise the sum of the 
sovereign welfare as specified in Equation (4.4) – equity weights for the global decision 
maker (Equation (4.2)), and a case inspired by symmetry, but for which we could not 
find an interpretation. 
Note that in all cases domestic impacts are valued with domestic values. 
3. The model 
This paper uses version 2.9 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and 
Distribution (FUND). Version 2.9 of FUND corresponds to version 1.6, described and 
applied by Tol (1999; 2001; 2002c), except for the impact module, which is described 
by Tol (2002a; b) and updated by Link and Tol (2006). A further difference is that the 
current version of the model distinguishes 16 instead of 9 regions. The model considers 
emission reduction of methane and nitrous oxide as well as carbon dioxide, as described 
by Tol (2006b). Finally, the model now has sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) and a newly 
calibrated radiative forcing code. A full list of papers, the source code and the technical 
documentation with all equations and all parameter values for the model can be found 
on line at http://www.fund-model.org. Readers familiar with FUND can skip to Section 
4 without loosing any continuity in our argument. 
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous 
perturbations. The model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United 
States of America, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central 
America, South America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, Sub-
104 
Saharan Africa, and Small Island States. The model runs from 1950 to 2300 in time 
steps of one year. The prime reason for starting in 1950 is to initialize the climate 
change impact module. In FUND, the impacts of climate change are assumed to depend 
on the impact of the previous year, this way reflecting the process of adjustment to 
climate change. Because the initial values to be used for the year 1950 cannot be 
approximated very well, both physical and monetized impacts of climate change tend to 





are included to assess the long-term implications of climate change. Previous versions 
of the model stopped at 2200. 
The period of 1950-2000 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the 
IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes and Goldewijk, 1994). The scenario for the period 
2010-2100 is based on the EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in 
between IS92a and IS92f (Leggett et al., 1992). The 2000-2010 period is interpolated 
from the immediate past (http://earthtrends.wri.org), and the period 2100-2300 
extrapolated. 
The scenarios are defined by the rates of population growth, economic growth, 
autonomous energy efficiency improvements as well as the rate of decarbonization of 
the energy use (autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), and emissions of carbon 
dioxide from land use change, methane and nitrous oxide. 
Welfare comparisons between regions figure prominently in some of the national social 
cost definitions of Section 2, in the form of ratios of per capita consumption. Therefore, 
we measure income in purchasing power parity exchange rates (PPP). This also affects 
the scenario. The original scenario is formulated in terms of market exchange rates 
(MER). It assumes a narrowing of the income gap between rich and poor. Following 
Tol (2006a), we assume an income elasticity of –0.28 for the PPP to MER ratio. That is, 
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in the PPP scenario, poor regions are richer at the start, but grow more slowly. This also 
affects emissions. Following Tol (2006a), we also adjust the scenario for energy 
efficiency improvements, such that the drop in the growth rate of energy use is halfway 
between the drop in economic growth rate and zero. That is, emissions grow less fast in 
the PPP scenario, but faster than a naïve adjustment with the economic growth rate 
would suggest (cf. Castles and Henderson, 2003). At the same time, the adjusted 
scenario for energy efficiency does not fully offset the adjusted income scenario either 
(cf. Gruebler et al., 2004). 
The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact of 
climatic change. Population decreases with increasing climate change related deaths that 
result from changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and tropical cyclones. Heat and 
cold stress are assumed to have an effect only on the elderly, non-reproductive 
population. In contrast, the other sources of mortality also affect the number of births. 
Heat stress only affects the urban population. The share of the urban population among 
the total population is based on the World Resources Databases 
(http://earthtrends.wri.org). It is extrapolated based on the statistical relationship 
between urbanization and per-capita income, which are estimated from a cross-section 
of countries in 1995. Climate-induced migration between the regions of the world also 
causes the population sizes to change. Immigrants are assumed to assimilate 
immediately and completely with the respective host population. 
The tangible impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy (cf. Fankhauser and Tol, 
2005). Consumption and investment are reduced without changing the savings rate.
30
 As 
a result, climate change reduces long-term economic growth, although consumption is 
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 The savings rate is exogenous in this paper, given that we do not present results from an intertemporal 
optimization exercise. See Fankhauser and Tol (2005) for an in depth discussion of climate change 
impacts and economic growth models.  
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particularly affected in the short-term. Economic growth is also reduced by carbon 
dioxide abatement measures. The energy intensity of the economy and the carbon 
intensity of the energy supply autonomously decrease over time. This process can be 
accelerated by abatement policies, an option not considered in this paper. 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur hexafluoride, the global mean temperature, 
the impact of carbon dioxide emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, 
and the impact of the damages to the economy and the population caused by climate 
change. Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the atmosphere, and then 
geometrically depleted. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide, measured in 
parts per million by volume, is represented by the five-box model of Maier-Reimer and 
Hasselmann (1987). Its parameters are taken from Hammitt et al. (1992). The model 
also contains sulphur emissions (Tol, 2006b). 
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulphur hexafluoride 
and sulphur aerosols is determined based on Ramaswamy et al. (2001). The global 
mean temperature T  is governed by a geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined 
by the radiative forcing RF ), with a half-life of 50 years. In the base case, the global 
mean temperature rises in equilibrium by 2.5°C for a doubling of carbon dioxide 
equivalents. Regional temperature follows from multiplying the global mean 
temperature by a fixed factor, which corresponds to the spatial climate change pattern 
averaged over 14 GCMs (Mendelsohn et al., 2000). The global mean sea level is also 
geometric, with its equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 50 
years. Both temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best guess 
temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996). 
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The climate impact module, based on Tol (2002a; b) includes the following categories: 
agriculture, forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to 
cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy 
consumption, water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems. Climate change related 
damages can be attributed to either the rate of change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/yr) or the 
level of change (benchmarked at 1.0°C). Damages from the rate of temperature change 
slowly fade, reflecting adaptation (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
People can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne diseases, or they 
can migrate because of sea level rise. Like all impacts of climate change, these effects 
are monetized. The value of a statistical life is set to be 200 times the annual per capita 
income. The resulting value of a statistical life lies in the middle of the observed range 
of values in the literature (cf. Cline, 1992). The value of emigration is set to be 3 times 
the per capita income (Tol, 1995b), the value of immigration is 40 per cent of the per 
capita income in the host region (Cline, 1992). Losses of dryland and wetlands due to 
sea level rise are modelled explicitly. The monetary value of a loss of one square 
kilometre of dryland was on average $4 million in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. 
Fankhauser, 1994). Dryland value is assumed to be proportional to GDP per square 
kilometre. Wetland losses are valued at $2 million per square kilometre on average in 
the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). The wetland value is assumed to have 
logistic relation to per capita income. Coastal protection is based on cost-benefit 
analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due to the construction of dikes 
and subsequent coastal squeeze. 
Other impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, water, and ecosystems, 
are directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer of impacts 
measured in their „natural‟ units (cf. Tol, 2002a). Impacts of climate change on energy 
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consumption, agriculture, and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases explicitly 
recognize that there is a climatic optimum, which is determined by a variety of factors, 
including plant physiology and the behaviour of farmers. Impacts are positive or 
negative depending on whether the actual climate conditions are moving closer to or 
away from that optimum climate. Impacts are larger if the initial climate conditions are 
further away from the optimum climate. The optimum climate is of importance with 
regard to the potential impacts. The actual impacts lag behind the potential impacts, 
depending on the speed of adaptation. The impacts of not being fully adapted to new 
climate conditions are always negative (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
The impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged ecosystems, water 
resources, diarrhoea malaria, dengue fever, and schistosomiasis are modelled as simple 
power functions. Impacts are either negative or positive, and they do not change sign 
(cf. Tol, 2002b).  
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and 
technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as 
water resources (with population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbanization), 
and ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes). Other systems are 
projected to become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with technological 
progress), agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and water-borne diseases 
(with improved health care) (cf. Tol, 2002b). The income elasticities in Tol (2002b) are 
estimated with cross-sections measured in MER incomes. Following Tol (2006a), they 
were adjusted for PPP. 
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4. Results 
Table 10 shows the marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide for a pure rate of time 
preference of 1% per year and a inequality aversion of 1. The simple sum of the 
regional marginal damage costs is $16/tC, well within the range of estimates in previous 
studies (Tol, 2005c). Split over 16 regions, under sovereignty, the marginal damage 
costs per region are obviously much lower. China stands out as very vulnerable. This is 
due to a range of factors, including its large size, aging population, precarious water 
supply, and economic concentration in the coastal zone. 
The equation for compensated marginal damage costs is similar to that in the 
cooperative case, but the discount rate is different. For regions with slow (fast) growth, 
the compensated marginal damage costs are higher (lower) than the cooperative costs. 
Cf. Table 9. 
The equity-weighted marginal damage costs are $28/tC, almost double the simple sum 
as more weight is placed on the higher impacts in the poorer regions. Good-
neighbourliness is similar to equity-weighting, but the normalisation is done with the 
regional rather than the world average income. As a result, good-neighbour marginal 
damage costs are much higher than equity-weighted damages for rich regions, and 
lower for poor regions. Cf. Table 9. 
The altruistic marginal damage costs are somewhere in between the sovereign costs and 
the good-neighbour costs. We here use 0.1  . 
The relative magnitudes of the marginal damage costs also give some insight into the 
preferences of regions. In every region, the sovereign damage costs are lowest. That is, 
free-riding pays. In the OECD, cooperation would lead to lower emission reduction than 
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compensation and good neighbourliness.
31
 In the poorest regions, being a good 
neighbour would imply the lowest emission reduction obligations (apart from 
sovereignty). In middle income countries, compensation would imply the minimum 
emission reduction. It is therefore unlikely that regions would be unanimous in agreeing 
what would be the “right” framework for setting marginal damage costs and hence 
marginal abatement costs. 
Table 11 and Table 12 show the same information, but for pure rates of time preference 
of 0% and 3%, respectively, in Table 10, the value is 1%. As one would expect, lower 
(higher) discount rates lead to higher (lower) marginal damage costs estimates. 
However, the relative positions of sovereign, cooperative, equity-weighted, altruistic, 
compensated, and good neighbour marginal damage costs is unchanged. 
Table 13 and Table 16 repeat this information for a inequality aversion of 0.5 and 2.0, 
respectively; Table 15 has the intermediate case of 1.5; in Table 10, the value is 1.0. 
Changing the CCRA has two effects: First, the equity weights change. Second, the 
discount rate changes. These two effects work in the opposite direction. 
Equity weights are unity for sovereign, cooperative, and compensated marginal damage 
costs. A higher (lower) inequality aversion implies a higher (lower) discount rate and 
lower (higher) marginal damage costs. 
For equity-weighted, altruistic, and good neighbour marginal damage costs, the rate of 
inequity aversion affects both the discount rate and the equity weight. In Table 14 and 
Table 17, we abandon Ramsey discounting and keep the discount rate as in the base 
case. This confirms that a higher (lower) inequity aversion implies higher (lower) 
equity-weights and higher (lower) marginal damage costs. 
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 The equity-weighted marginal damage costs are also lower than the compensated and good neighbour 
ones for the OECD. However, equity-weighted marginal damage costs cannot be compared to unweighted 
regional marginal abatement costs. 
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Returning to Table 13 and Table 16, we see that the discount-rate effect tends to 
dominate the equity-weight effect, except in the richest regions (e.g., good-neighbour 
marginal costs in Japan and South Korea) where the marginal cost first falls and then 
rises with a rising rate of inequity aversion. 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Climate change is a global problem, but decisions are made by national decision 
makers. In previous papers, researchers have discussed the appropriate carbon tax for a 
global decision maker. Here, we discuss the appropriate carbon tax for a national 
decision maker. We distinguish four different cases. First, the national decision maker 
does not care about what happens abroad. Second, the national decision maker is 
altruistic towards foreigners. Third, the national decision maker compensates damages 
done abroad. Fourth, the national decision makers feels responsible for damages done 
abroad, but cannot compensate. Carbon taxes are lowest in the first case (sovereignty). 
They are highest in the fourth case (good neighbour) for the richest regions, and in the 
third case (compensation) for the poorest regions. Middle income regions may face the 
highest carbon taxes under international cooperation. This order is robust to the choice 
of the pure rate of time preference and the inequality aversion, but carbon taxes are 
higher if the pure rate of time preference is lower, and carbon taxes tend to be higher if 
the inequality aversion is higher. 
Further research in this field would certainly be welcome. The analysis here should be 
reproduced with other integrated assessment models. A wider range of utility and 
welfare functions should be explored, and the link between the utility function and the 
willingness to pay for climate change impacts should be made. The interactions between 
risk and inequity aversion should be added. The resolution of the model should be 
refined, and further interactions between actors should be added. And, of course, the 
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implications of our research for greenhouse gas emission reduction, both in a 
cooperative and a non-cooperative setting, need to be investigated. 
The policy implications are twofold. First, a wide range of carbon taxes can be 
defended. The highest carbon tax differs from the lowest carbon tax by up to a factor 70 
for a 1% pure rate of time preference, and up to a factor 470 for a 0% PRTP. This large 
difference is due to different ethical positions on the kind of responsibility one country 
should have towards other countries. Climate policy is a moral issue. Moral positions 
can be debated, and although reasonable people will disagree, politicians should be able 
to resolve this. Indeed, some would argue that that is what politicians are for. 
Furthermore, the stated willingness to pay for climate policy can be “inverted” to find 
the corresponding ethical position. The EU price of CO2 permits is some $82/tC,
32
 so 
European politicians have a pure rate of time preference that is well below 3% and do 
display concern for non-European impacts.
33
 This of course begs the question of 
consistency. European pensions policy suffers from short-termism, while European 
agricultural policy hurts other countries. 
The second policy implication is as follows. The results presented here show that, 
without cooperation, different regions should have different carbon taxes. This is not 
news. See Bradford (2005), Helm (2003), Rehdanz and Tol (2005), and Tol (2005c) for 
ways to reconcile non-cooperative target-setting with international trade in emission 
permits. However, this paper also shows that a lack of international cooperation on 
target-setting does not necessarily lead to low carbon taxes. If countries agree to 
compensate one another for the damage they do to one another, carbon taxes would be 
substantial. One may argue that that obligation already exists in principle, but practice is 
                                                 
32
 €16.08/tCO2; 0.719 $/€; price and exchange rate of 22 December 2008 
33
 Note that different assumptions about future emissions, climate change, and impacts may also explain a 
higher willingness to pay. 
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different. Nonetheless, if our results are to be believed, a treaty on international liability 
would drive climate policy harder than in the cooperative optimum. But also without 
any international treaty, a sense of concern for foreign lands, be it in its altruistic or its 
good neighbourly form, would also lead countries to adopt a more stringent climate 
policy than is in their strict self-interest. In turn, this would reduce the fear of leakage 
and lost competitiveness in other countries and may lead to increased abatement there as 
well. 
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 Population Income Impact 
 (millions) (PPP $/cap) (-) (% GDP) 
 2000 2100 2000 2100/2000 2100 
USA 278 298 37,317 3.7 -0.51 
CAN 31 34 25,498 3.8 -0.14 
WEU 388 396 30,312 3.9 -0.91 
JPK 171 223 42,872 4.4 0.19 
ANZ 20 28 21,437 3.8 0.47 
EEU 125 126 5,394 6.0 -0.64 
FSU 293 292 4,493 5.2 -4.04 
MDE 241 553 3,397 7.7 1.05 
CAM 137 216 6,783 5.4 -0.12 
SAM 346 537 7,920 5.4 -0.41 
SAS 1,366 2,630 1,984 5.9 -0.45 
SEA 630 1,197 4,588 5.9 -1.49 
CHI 1,315 1,712 5,509 8.1 -0.41 
NAF 143 401 2,248 6.2 -4.40 
SSA 639 1,831 1,198 5.2 -1.99 
SIS 43 66 1,545 9.3 0.29 
World 6,168 10,541 8,580 3.9 -0.63 




 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good neighbour 
USA 0.91 13.35 33.76 125.27 
CAN 0.07 8.62 33.28 85.60 
WEU 1.54 11.56 32.35 101.76 
JPK 0.30 14.66 27.95 143.92 
ANZ 0.06 7.25 33.15 71.97 
EEU 0.12 1.92 17.89 18.11 
FSU 0.80 2.23 24.32 15.08 
MDE 0.38 1.49 9.82 11.40 
CAM 0.26 2.51 17.28 22.77 
SAM 0.23 2.86 15.11 26.59 
SAS 1.07 1.63 17.28 6.66 
SEA 1.27 2.68 16.42 15.40 
CHI 7.49 8.59 12.70 18.49 
NAF 0.43 1.14 13.39 7.55 
SSA 0.57 0.92 18.85 4.02 
SIS 0.07 0.58 8.54 5.19 
Cooperation 15.56    
Equity weights 27.86    
Table 10: The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure 




 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good neighbour 
USA 5.06 86.45 230.66 818.93 
CAN 0.39 56.31 227.44 559.58 
WEU 9.33 74.91 222.08 665.21 
JPK 2.42 96.26 189.33 940.86 
ANZ 0.39 47.40 226.58 470.45 
EEU 0.83 12.58 117.34 118.37 
FSU 4.99 14.35 164.83 98.61 
MDE 2.70 9.88 61.17 74.55 
CAM 1.83 16.53 109.59 148.86 
SAM 1.40 18.64 94.04 173.81 
SAS 7.31 10.93 114.78 43.54 
SEA 8.08 17.34 105.49 100.69 
CHI 50.30 57.36 84.13 120.90 
NAF 2.51 7.19 85.88 49.34 
SSA 3.49 5.77 121.86 26.29 
SIS 0.48 3.82 54.38 33.91 
Cooperation 101.49    
Equity weights 182.12    
Table 11: The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure 




 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good neighbour 
USA 0.05 0.57 1.33 5.22 
CAN 0.00 0.36 1.31 3.57 
WEU 0.08 0.49 1.27 4.24 
JPK 0.00 0.60 1.12 6.00 
ANZ 0.00 0.30 1.31 3.00 
EEU 0.00 0.08 0.75 0.75 
FSU 0.04 0.10 0.98 0.63 
MDE 0.01 0.06 0.44 0.48 
CAM 0.01 0.10 0.75 0.95 
SAM 0.01 0.12 0.68 1.11 
SAS 0.04 0.06 0.71 0.28 
SEA 0.05 0.11 0.70 0.64 
CHI 0.31 0.35 0.53 0.77 
NAF 0.02 0.05 0.58 0.31 
SSA 0.03 0.04 0.80 0.17 
SIS 0.00 0.02 0.37 0.22 
Cooperation 0.66    
Equity weights 1.16    
Table 12: The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure 




 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good neighbour 
USA 2.13 17.14 84.22 152.17 
CAN 0.16 12.72 83.62 125.78 
WEU 3.80 17.13 82.48 137.14 
JPK 0.87 17.10 76.49 163.10 
ANZ 0.14 11.66 83.46 115.33 
EEU 0.42 6.17 60.85 57.85 
FSU 2.28 7.34 71.29 52.80 
MDE 1.86 6.27 44.57 45.91 
CAM 0.94 7.33 59.45 64.88 
SAM 0.83 7.76 55.35 70.10 
SAS 3.77 6.90 59.94 35.09 
SEA 4.48 9.37 58.09 53.36 
CHI 30.36 33.17 51.30 58.47 
NAF 1.60 5.18 52.39 37.35 
SSA 1.85 4.39 62.35 27.27 
SIS 0.35 3.42 41.72 30.96 
Cooperation 55.87    
Equity weights 71.76    
Table 13: The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure 




 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good neighbour 
USA 0.91 4.93 33.76 41.08 
CAN 0.07 3.46 33.28 33.96 
WEU 1.54 5.09 32.35 37.03 
JPK 0.30 4.67 27.95 44.03 
ANZ 0.06 3.16 33.15 31.14 
EEU 0.12 1.67 17.89 15.62 
FSU 0.80 2.15 24.32 14.26 
MDE 0.38 1.59 9.82 12.40 
CAM 0.26 1.98 17.28 17.52 
SAM 0.23 2.10 15.11 18.93 
SAS 1.07 1.91 17.28 9.47 
SEA 1.27 2.58 16.42 14.40 
CHI 7.49 8.32 12.70 15.78 
NAF 0.43 1.39 13.39 10.08 
SSA 0.57 1.25 18.85 7.36 
SIS 0.07 0.90 8.54 8.36 
Cooperation 15.56    
Equity weights 19.37    
Table 14: The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure 
rate of time preference of 1% per year and a inequality aversion of 0.5; inequality 




 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good neighbour 
USA 0.40 12.70 13.84 123.46 
CAN 0.03 7.00 13.55 69.73 
WEU 0.64 9.61 12.97 90.38 
JPK 0.10 15.29 10.49 152.03 
ANZ 0.02 5.40 13.47 53.76 
EEU 0.04 0.71 5.46 6.78 
FSU 0.29 0.77 8.53 5.16 
MDE 0.08 0.41 2.29 3.39 
CAM 0.07 1.02 5.25 9.57 
SAM 0.07 1.27 4.36 12.07 
SAS 0.31 0.43 5.15 1.51 
SEA 0.37 0.87 4.84 5.32 
CHI 1.91 2.42 3.26 7.00 
NAF 0.12 0.29 3.58 1.83 
SSA 0.18 0.24 5.93 0.71 
SIS 0.01 0.12 1.84 1.04 
Cooperation 4.65    
Equity weights 12.95    
Table 15: The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure 




 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good neighbour 
USA 0.18 14.85 5.80 146.86 
CAN 0.01 6.87 5.63 68.57 
WEU 0.27 9.93 5.31 96.90 
JPK 0.03 19.42 4.03 193.84 
ANZ 0.01 4.85 5.59 48.47 
EEU 0.01 0.32 1.72 3.07 
FSU 0.11 0.31 3.07 2.13 
MDE 0.02 0.14 0.56 1.22 
CAM 0.02 0.50 1.66 4.85 
SAM 0.02 0.68 1.32 6.62 
SAS 0.09 0.13 1.58 0.42 
SEA 0.11 0.32 1.48 2.22 
CHI 0.51 0.78 0.86 3.20 
NAF 0.04 0.08 0.99 0.53 
SSA 0.06 0.07 1.93 0.15 
SIS 0.00 0.03 0.42 0.25 
Cooperation 1.49    
Equity weights 7.26    
Table 16: The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure 




 Sovereign Altruism Compensation Good neighbour 
USA 0.91 43.83 33.76 430.14 
CAN 0.07 24.36 33.28 242.95 
WEU 1.54 32.88 32.35 314.90 
JPK 0.30 53.23 27.95 529.68 
ANZ 0.06 18.78 33.15 187.29 
EEU 0.12 2.47 17.89 23.64 
FSU 0.80 2.52 24.32 17.97 
MDE 0.38 1.53 9.82 11.81 
CAM 0.26 3.57 17.28 33.34 
SAM 0.23 4.41 15.11 42.06 
SAS 1.07 1.49 17.28 5.27 
SEA 1.27 2.99 16.42 18.54 
CHI 7.49 9.18 12.70 24.40 
NAF 0.43 1.02 13.39 6.36 
SSA 0.57 0.76 18.85 2.47 
SIS 0.07 0.43 8.54 3.62 
Cooperation 15.56    
Equity weights 45.11    
Table 17: The regional marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide (in $/tC), for a pure 
rate of time preference of 1% per year and inequality aversion of 1.5; inequality 
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V Optimal Dynamic Carbon Taxation 
1. Introduction 
It is almost a common place in the economics of climate change that a good response to 
the challenges posed by global warming would be a harmonized, global tax on 
greenhouse gas emissions that increases over time roughly with the discount rate (e.g. 
Nordhaus, 2007c). Many details of such proposal are hotly discussed, but one aspect 
receives relatively little questioning in the economic literature: should a carbon tax 
really be harmonized across the world, i.e. should the same tax rate on carbon emissions 
be enforced in all countries? 
The classical role of a Pigouvian tax on an economic activity that creates an externality 
is to correct the inefficiency associated with damages that are not reflected in market 
prices of goods. Traditionally distributional consequences are not dealt with at this 
stage, but rather it is assumed that other instruments can or will be used to “make up” 
for any unwanted distributional consequence caused by the correction of the externality. 
This is in the spirit of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks, 1939), i.e. that 
distributional issues ought to be separated from questions of economic efficiency. While 
there is a convincing argument that within one jurisdiction a government that could 
impose a tax on an externality does also have the necessary means (e.g. the income tax) 
to correct any undesirable distributional consequence caused by such a Pigouvian tax, 
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this argument does not apply equally to cross-national cases of externalities or public 
goods. Climate change as a truly global public good is a classical example of that. 
An early discussion of this problem was provided in Chichilnisky and Heal (1994)
34
. 
They contrasted optimal marginal abatement costs of carbon emissions in a multi region 
setting when lump sum transfers are possible between different regions with a situation 
in which such transfers are ruled out. They found that in the latter optimal marginal 
abatement costs were different in each region, whereas with lump sum transfers the 
classical result of equated marginal abatement costs prevailed. They used a static model 
around a global public bad as an approximation to the climate change problem, but 
given the inherent dynamic nature of the climate problem, they mostly derived basic 
theoretical results that as such are hard to apply to concrete climate change policy 
questions. 
Sandmo (2006) investigates the question of optimal Pigouvian taxes in relation to a 
global externality, again in a static utilitarian framework. He comes to a similar 
conclusion as Heal and Chichilnisky: Unless one assumes that lump sum transfers 
between regions are possible, optimal Pigouvian taxes on the externality producing 
activity should not be harmonized or equalized across countries, but rather poor 
countries should impose lower taxes than rich countries. 
The basic result that under certain welfare functions and an absence of lump sum 
transfers marginal abatement costs ought not to be equated has been discussed in a 
number of other papers as well. Most of these treatments stick to a static description of 
the problem, which makes their results not immediately applicable to a simulation of a 
stock externality problem like climate change with an integrated assessment model. 
Eyckmans et al. (1993) show not only that marginal abatement costs might differ 
                                                 
34
 Sheeran (2006) provides an extended discussion of the same result. 
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between world regions in an optimum for specific welfare functions, but also discuss 
how various choices of welfare weights correspond to different results from negotiation 
processes. Shiell (2003b) acknowledges the basic result in Chichilnisky and Heal but 
argues that with a permit market the necessary lump sum transfers can always be 
obtained via the initial allocation of permits and that therefore differentiated marginal 
abatement costs could be avoided
35
. In this paper I look at a situation where this option 
is for whatever reason not possible. I will not give a stringent argument for this, but it 
seems at least plausible that large wealth transfers from rich to poor countries via initial 
allocation rules in a permit market might be politically infeasible. 
Other papers have dealt with equity in climate change abatement in broader terms. Tol 
(2001) and Tol (2002c) look at optimal emission abatement under a variety of different 
welfare functions. Böhringer and Helm (2008) look at equity with respect to abatement 
costs only.  
In this paper I build upon those results and extend them such that they can readily be 
employed for the analysis of climate change. On a theoretical level, I extend the analysis 
into a dynamic setting with a global stock externality, thus allowing an application to 
climate change. In doing so I also clarify how the discount rate is modified in an 
optimal setting that does not allow for lump sum transfers between regions. In a second 
step I then apply the integrated assessment model FUND to the problem and derive 
numerical estimates of optimal tax rates on carbon emissions, the corresponding optimal 
emission trajectory and optimal temperature targets. In a final step I do a sensitivity 
analysis of the results with respect to the key preference parameters of the pure rate of 
time preference and the inequality aversion. 
                                                 
35
 Shiell (2003a) uses a similar set up of welfare functions, dynamic optimization and regional 
disaggregation as used in this paper, but by assumption rules out differences in marginal abatement costs 
between regions, thereby focusing on a different question than I try to answer in this paper.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as following: In section 2, I present a theoretical 
model of optimal marginal abatement costs of a global public bad in a setting with and 
without lump sum transfers and derive key necessary conditions for an optimal 
emissions trajectory. In section 3 a brief description of the integrated assessment model 
FUND is given. Section 4 presents results and section 5 concludes. 
2. Theory 
Let 
,t rx  be carbon emissions in year t  in region r . Total emissions in year t  are defined 
as ,t t rrX x . Greenhouse gas concentrations S  in each year are characterised by a 
transition function g   
  1 ,t t tS g S X   (5.1) 
Concentrations depend on previous concentrations and current emissions from all 
regions. 
Per capita consumption 
,t rc  in year t  in region r  is 
  
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  (5.2) 
where 
,t rC  is total consumption, ,t rD  is climate change damage and ,t rP  is population. 
Consumption is assumed to depend on emissions, where we assume that  , 0 0t rC  , 
that there is an emissions level ,t rx  that maximizes consumption and that ,t rC  is strictly 
concave. It follows that for all emission levels between 0 and ,t rx , increasing emissions 
will increase consumption, i.e.  , 0t rC x   for all  ,0, t rx x . C  is calibrated such that 
the optimal emissions level x  and its corresponding income C  follow the business as 
usual scenario of the FUND model. 
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Damage in period t  depends both on the stock of carbon in the atmosphere at that time. 
Due to the formulation of the transition function, tS  only accounts for emissions in 
periods before t , but actual carbon concentrations at t  also depend on emissions in t . 
Therefore damage in period t  is a function of both tS  as well as tX  concentrations , as 
well as on total emissions of all regions in the current period. 
2.1. Optimal emissions path 
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for a standard utilitarian welfare function, with 
0S  being the carbon concentration at the 
start of the optimization period. 0 1   is the per period discount factor. We also 
assume that the utility function U  has the usual iso-elastic form: 














 for this problem are 
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, , 1 1,max
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x r
V S P U c S x V S t      (5.5) 
for each time t , with  t tV S  as the value function for time t . The first order conditions 
for the maximization problem of the value function for year t  are 
     , , 1 1
,
, 0 .t r t r t t t t
rt i




   
  
  (5.6) 
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 The problem could of course also be solved by simply using Lagrange multiplier, given the finite time 
horizon of the model. A dynamic programming approach seems nevertheless easier and less convoluted. 
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Using standard finite time horizon dynamic programming practice, we start deriving 
first order conditions at the end of the time horizon T , and then derive first order 
conditions for earlier time steps t  going back in time until we reach 0t  . Given the 
complexities of the integrated assessment model used for this exercise, I do not derive 
an analytical solution for the value function, but rather find first order conditions that I 
can then use in a numerical search algorithm for the optimal emissions path. 
Let a marginal emission of carbon in year t  cause marginal damage MD  in year s  and 
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   
 
   (5.8) 
This is a variation of the familiar rule that marginal abatement costs should equal 
marginal damage costs, but with some important modifications. On the left hand side 
are marginal abatement costs for a specific region i  in year t . The right hand side of the 
equation is the weighted sum of marginal damages happening in every year after t  in all 
regions. There are two weights applied, first the pure time preference factor 
 1 1
s ts t 
    with the pure rate of time preference  . The second weight after the 
summation sign over regions (part a) is a combination of distributional weights and the 
growth part in the standard Ramsey discount rate. Two different interpretations can help 
understand this second weight. 
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             
 (5.9) 
Here  1 2, ,g c c t  is defined as the average constant growth rate at which per capita 
consumption would grow from 1c  to 2c  over a time span of t  years.
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 Part c is the 
standard Ramsey type discount factor for region r , based on per capita growth of the 
region where the damages occur. 
Part b is a distributional weight that is applied to the net present value of damage in a 
particular region. The distributional weight given to marginal damages occurring in the 
region for which we have marginal abatement costs in the equation will always be one, 
so that abatement and damages are valued equally and consistently (Anthoff et al., 
2009). Marginal damages in other regions receive a distributional weight that will be >1 
(<1) for regions with lower (higher) per capita consumption than the regions for which 
abatement costs are calculated. 
To see the second interpretation we rewrite part a and the time discount factor as: 
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 (5.10) 
The expression on the right hand side of equation (5.10) is just the standard Ramsey 
type discount rate with a per capita growth rate that goes from the current level of the 
                                                 
37
 g  is defined by the equation  1 1 2 21 , ,
t
c g c c t c    . 
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abating region to the per capita consumption of the region and the time where the 
marginal damage is occurring. Note that in principal this discount rate can be negative, 
when abatement costs are calculated for a region with a high current per capita income 
and damages that occur in a lower per capita region relative to that. 
We can now ask ourselves how optimal marginal abatement costs for different regions 
will look like. Another rearrangement of equation (5.8) gets us 
        , , , , ,, ,
T
s t
t i t i t i t t s r s s s r
s t r
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           (5.11) 
for marginal abatement costs in region i . Notice that except for part d all terms on the 
right hand side of the equation are the same for all regions. This allows for an easy 
interpretation: Optimal marginal abatement costs are higher for higher per capita 
consumption regions, and that effect is stronger for higher inequality parameters  , 
where higher inequality also increases the difference between the optimal marginal 
abatement costs of different regions. 
2.2. Efficient emissions path 
We now derive efficient abatement costs. Unlike the previous section, we ignore 
distributional questions between regions this time. The welfare economic rationale for 
such an approach would be the assumption that lump sum transfers are feasible and that 
any desirable distributional outcome can be achieved in a second step via such lossless 
transfers, after the externality has been internalized via a Pigouvian price signal – that 
is, the Coase (1960) Theorem holds. 
Following the standard approach in the literature we replace our objective function with 
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We calibrate the Negishi weights   such that in our base case run marginal utility is 
equalized across all regions at each time step. In order to achieve this we follow the 
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 (5.13) 
where we define tc  to be world average per capita consumption at time t . 
The new Bellman equations are 
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for all time periods. Note that in this case in each time step marginal abatement costs are 
equal for all regions, given that the right hand side of equation (5.15) is the same for all 
regions. The weight given to the marginal damage term is reduced to the standard 
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 (5.16) 
with sg  being the annual growth rate of world average per capita consumption from 
time t  to s . 
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3. The Model 
FUND (the Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution) is an 
integrated assessment model linking projections of populations, economic activity and 
emissions to a simple carbon cycle and climate model, and to a model predicting and 
monetizing welfare impacts. Climate change welfare impacts are monetarized in 1995 
dollars and are modelled over 16 regions. Modelled welfare impacts include agriculture, 
forestry, sea level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders influenced by cold and 
heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption, 
water resources, and unmanaged ecosystems (Link and Tol, 2004). The source code, 
data, and a technical description of the model can be found at http://www.fund-
model.org. 
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous 
perturbations. The model distinguishes 16 major regions of the world, viz. the United 
States of America, Canada, Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, Australia and New 
Zealand, Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, Central 
America, South America, South Asia, Southeast Asia, China, North Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa, and Small Island States. Version 3.4, used in this paper, runs from 1950 
to 3000 in time steps of one year. The primary reason for starting in 1950 is to initialize 
the climate change impact module. In FUND, the welfare impacts of climate change are 
assumed to depend in part on the impacts during the previous year, reflecting the 
process of adjustment to climate change. Because the initial values to be used for the 
year 1950 cannot be approximated very well, both physical impacts and monetized 
welfare impacts of climate change tend to be misrepresented in the first few decades of 




 centuries are included to provide a proper long-term 
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perspective. The remaining centuries are included to avoid endpoint problems for low 
discount rates, they have only a very minor impact on overall results.  
The period of 1950-1990 is used for the calibration of the model, which is based on the 
IMAGE 100-year database (Batjes and Goldewijk, 1994). The period 1990-2000 is 
based on observations (http://earthtrends.wri.org). The 2000-2010 period is interpolated 
from the immediate past. The climate scenarios for the period 2010-2100 are based on 
the EMF14 Standardized Scenario, which lies somewhere in between IS92a and IS92f 
(Leggett et al., 1992). The period 2100-3000 is extrapolated. 
The scenarios are defined by varied rates of population growth, economic growth, 
autonomous energy efficiency improvements, and decarbonization of energy use 
(autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), as well as by emissions of carbon 
dioxide from land use change, methane emissions, and nitrous oxide emissions. 
Emission reduction of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide is specified as in Tol 
(2006b). Simple cost curves are used for the economic impact of abatement, with 
limited scope for endogenous technological progress and interregional spillovers (Tol, 
2005b). 
The scenarios of economic growth are perturbed by the effects of climatic change.
38
 
Climate-induced migration between the regions of the world causes the population sizes 
to change. Immigrants are assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the 
respective host population. 
The tangible welfare impacts are dead-weight losses to the economy. Consumption and 
investment are reduced without changing the savings rate. As a result, climate change 
reduces long-term economic growth, although consumption is particularly affected in 
                                                 
38
 Note that in the standard version of FUND population growth is also perturbed by climate change 
impacts. That particular feature was switched off in the runs for this paper because endogenous 
population changes cannot be evaluated with the kind of welfare function investigated. 
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the short-term. Economic growth is also reduced by carbon dioxide abatement 
measures. The energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy 
supply autonomously decrease over time. This process can be accelerated by abatement 
policies. 
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of carbon 
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the effect of carbon 
dioxide emission reductions on the economy and on emissions, and the effect of the 
damages on the economy caused by climate change. Methane and nitrous oxide are 
taken up in the atmosphere, and then geometrically depleted. The atmospheric 
concentration of carbon dioxide, measured in parts per million by volume, is 
represented by the five-box model of Maier-Reimer and Hasselmann (1987). Its 
parameters are taken from Hammitt et al. (1992).  
The radiative forcing of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and sulphur aerosols is 
determined based on Shine et al. (1990). The global mean temperature, T , is governed 
by a geometric build-up to its equilibrium (determined by the radiative forcing, RF ), 
with a half-life of 50 years. In the base case, the global mean temperature rises in 
equilibrium by 2.5°C for a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents. Regional 
temperature is derived by multiplying the global mean temperature by a fixed factor, 
which corresponds to the spatial climate change pattern averaged over 14 GCMs 
(Mendelsohn et al., 2000). The global mean sea level is also geometric, with its 
equilibrium level determined by the temperature and a half-life of 50 years. Both 
temperature and sea level are calibrated to correspond to the best guess temperature and 
sea level for the IS92a scenario of Kattenberg et al. (1996). 
The climate welfare impact module, based on Tol (2002a; b) includes the following 
categories: agriculture, forestry, hurricanes, sea level rise, cardiovascular and 
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respiratory disorders related to cold and heat stress, malaria, dengue fever, 
schistosomiasis, diarrhoea, energy consumption, water resources, and unmanaged 
ecosystems. Climate change related damages are triggered by either the rate of 
temperature change (benchmarked at 0.04°C/yr) or the level of temperature change 
(benchmarked at 1.0°C). Damages from the rate of temperature change slowly fade, 
reflecting adaptation (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
In the model individuals can die prematurely due to temperature stress or vector-borne 
diseases, or they can migrate because of sea level rise. Like all welfare impacts of 
climate change, these effects are monetized. The value of a statistical life is set to be 
200 times the annual per capita income.
39
 The resulting value of a statistical life lies in 
the middle of the observed range of values in the literature (cf. Cline, 1992). The value 
of emigration is set to be three times the per capita income (Tol, 1995a; 1996), the value 
of immigration is 40 per cent of the per capita income in the host region (Cline, 1992). 
Losses of dryland and wetlands due to sea level rise are modelled explicitly. The 
monetary value of a loss of one square kilometre of dryland was on average $4 million 
in OECD countries in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). Dryland value is assumed to be 
proportional to GDP per square kilometre. Wetland losses are valued at $2 million per 
square kilometre on average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser, 1994). The wetland 
value is assumed to have a logistic relation to per capita income. Coastal protection is 
based on cost-benefit analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due to the 
construction of dikes and subsequent coastal squeeze. 
Other welfare impact categories, such as agriculture, forestry, hurricanes, energy, water, 
and ecosystems, are directly expressed in monetary values without an intermediate layer 
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 Note that this implies that the monetary value of health risk is effectively discounted with the pure rate 
of time preference rather than with the consumption rate of discount (Horowitz, 2002). It also implies 
that, after equity weighing, the value of a statistical life is equal across the world (Fankhauser et al., 
1997). 
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of impacts measured in their „natural‟ units (cf. Tol, 2002a). Modelled effects of climate 
change on energy consumption, agriculture, and cardiovascular and respiratory diseases 
explicitly recognize that there is a climatic optimum, which is determined by a variety 
of factors, including plant physiology and the behaviour of farmers. Impacts are positive 
or negative depending on whether the actual climate conditions are moving closer to or 
away from that optimum climate. Impacts are larger if the initial climate conditions are 
further away from the optimum climate. The optimum climate is of importance with 
regard to the potential impacts. The actual impacts lag behind the potential impacts, 
depending on the speed of adaptation. The impacts of not being fully adapted to new 
climate conditions are always negative (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
The welfare impacts of climate change on coastal zones, forestry, hurricanes, 
unmanaged ecosystems, water resources, diarrhoea, malaria, dengue fever, and 
schistosomiasis are modelled as simple power functions. Impacts are either negative or 
positive, and they do not change sign (cf. Tol, 2002b).  
Vulnerability to climate change changes with population growth, economic growth, and 
technological progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such as 
water resources (with population growth) and heat-related disorders (with urbanization), 
or more valuable, such as ecosystems and health (with higher per capita incomes). Other 
systems are projected to become less vulnerable, such as energy consumption (with 
technological progress), agriculture (with economic growth) and vector- and water-
borne diseases (with improved health care) (cf. Tol, 2002b). 
4. Results 
In this section I will present results for an optimal tax scheme in which lump sum 
transfers between regions are assumed to be possible and one where there are no 
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transfers. These correspond to the two welfare functions presented in section 2. After 
presenting some results for key indicators like tax rates, emission rates and temperature 
development, I will present sensitivity analysis for a number of key parameters. 
4.1. Central results 
Figure 17 contrasts tax rates for the different regions of FUND in the year 2005 for a 
specific calibration of the utility function (pure rate of time preference of 1% and η of 
1). In the case with the possibility of transfer payments, optimal tax rates (or marginal 
abatement costs) are equal in all regions at $23/tC
40
. When transfer or compensation 
payments are ruled out, tax rates differ greatly between regions, with optimal tax rates 
for rich regions (ANZ, CAN, WEU, USA and JPK) increasing up to $179 for Japan, 
while the tax rate decreases in all other regions, to below $2 for very poor regions like 
sub Saharan Africa. China‟s optimal tax is almost reduced by 50% to $12. 
As income differences between regions change over time, so does the spread of tax rates 
between different regions. Figure 18 shows optimal tax rates for a few selected regions 
in the year 2050 and 2100 for the same utility function calibration as previous. For the 
scenario with lump sum transfers the optimal tax increases to $60 in the year 2050 and 
$148 in the year 2100 for all regions. The assumed rapid economic growth of China in 
the scenario makes for a dramatic adjustment of its optimal tax rate over time: In the 
year 2050 the tax without transfers payments is just 15% below the global tax rate in a 
scenario with lump sum transfers (compared to 50% in the year 2005), and in the year 
2100 China would actually have a higher tax on carbon emissions in a scenario without 
transfers compared to one with. 
Figure 19 demonstrates what these tax rates imply in terms of emissions reductions per 
region. The graph shows the reduction of emissions in percent in the year 2050 for each 
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 All results are in 1995 USD. 
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region compared to its emissions in a business as usual scenario.
41
 In the scenario with 
lump sum transfers the question in which regions reductions occur is only determined 
by the cost of emission reductions, i.e. regions with a lot of low cost mitigation 
opportunities will show large reductions in emissions while regions with only costly 
mitigation options will reduce less. In regions such as the former Soviet Union, where 
mitigation can be achieved at low cost, the assumption of no lump sum transfers leads 
to a situation where those low cost abatement opportunities are not picked up, given that 
they would be paid for by the relatively low income population of that region. On the 
other hand, rich regions will mitigate a lot more, although it is costly, given that in the 
utilitarian welfare calculus those high costs do get less weight when they occur to the 
relatively wealthy population of the United States. 
While the differences between regions vary greatly between a scenario with lump sum 
transfers and one in which this is ruled out, the total emission reduction stays almost the 
same at around 19%. While the difference is small, the assumption that no 
compensation will take place actually leads to a lower total optimal worldwide 
reduction in emissions. This is a somewhat surprising result, previously there was a 
sense that taking equity between regions explicitly into account in climate change 
policy would lead to more stringent mitigation policies. As the results in this paper 
show, at least under one widely used ethical framework, utilitarianism, this need not be 
the case. Inequality aversion and a concern for equity will in general give more weight 
to both impacts and mitigation costs in poor regions than in high income regions. The 
poor are especially vulnerable to climate change impacts and it has been shown 
repeatedly that when one only looks into impacts of climate change, a concern for 
equity increases damage estimates (c.f. Fankhauser et al., 1997; Pearce, 2003; Tol et al., 
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 In particular these are not reductions compared to a historic base line point (like 1990 or today). 
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2003; Anthoff et al., 2009), from which one might conclude that more mitigation would 
be justified under such an approach. The analysis in this paper on the other hand also 
gives higher weight to mitigation costs in poor regions. If a lot of cheap mitigation 
options are located in poor regions, such a treatment will have the effect that lower 
mitigation is appropriate when a concern for equity is present. As the results in this 
paper show, the latter effect dominates and overall mitigation is lower with a concern 
for equity. 
4.2. Sensitivity analysis 
Do these findings vary for different calibrations of the welfare function, in particular for 
different choices for the pure rate of time preference and inequality aversion? Table 18 
shows the resulting temperature increase above pre-industrial temperatures in °C in the 
year 2100 for the business as usual scenario and contrasts it with the temperature 
increase that would result if one would choose the optimal mitigation path for various 
calibrations of the utility function. 
The first general result is that for a high pure rate of time preference of 3% there is 
hardly any difference in the optimal temperature target in the year 2100 over both 
different preference parameters and scenarios with and without transfer payments, while 
even the difference between a business as usual scenario and optimal policy scenarios is 
small. Note also that some of the combinations should not be taken too serious, in 
particular one would not want to combine a high pure rate of time preference with a 
high inequality aversion, given that this would lead to real interest rates that are above 
the observed market rate, unless total factor productivity growth has been overestimated 
(cf. Nordhaus, 2008 for a careful discussion).  
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A second general conclusion is that for higher choices of inequality aversion, in general 
less stringent temperature targets are optimal.
42
 While this result would not be 
surprising if inequalities between regions were neglected (in which case higher 
inequality versions would simply increase the discount rate), it does not follow 
analytically for a setup as used in this paper, where higher inequality aversion between 
regions might have led to a different result. As such the findings in this paper support 
the conclusion that while higher inequality aversion might alter the distribution of 
mitigation efforts between regions, overall it will not lead to more stringent optimal 
global mitigation targets. 
When comparing a transfer with a no transfer scenario, the results for different utility 
function calibrations is more nuanced. While for an inequality aversion of 1, the optimal 
temperature target is always less stringent if one assumes that no transfers are possible, 
this result reverses for higher inequality aversion choices. While higher inequality 
values have been suggested as reasonable for purely intertemporal decisions (Dasgupta, 
2008), they would further widen the gap between actually wealth transfers between rich 
and poor regions and what the optimal wealth transfer according to the welfare function 
would be (Okun, 1975). The difficulty of using one parameter to both specify inter- as 
well as intra-temporal inequality aversion (and in non-deterministic models risk 
aversion as well) has been recognised in the literature, but not yet been resolved (Saelen 
et al., 2008). 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper I contrast a first-best world in which an optimal emissions path is 
calculated purely based on an efficiency criterion, i.e. under the assumption that any 
distributional consequences of a specific policy can be dealt with at a later stage with 
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 With one minor exception, but that is so small that it seems not important. 
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different (and costless) instruments, with a look at a specific ethical framework and a 
global decision maker that is constraint in its policy options. In particular, I assumed in 
a second step that a global decision maker has the ability to set mitigation paths for all 
regions, but does not have any instruments at hand to compensate for unwanted 
distributional disturbances caused by the emission control policy. In this second 
scenario I looked at a specific welfare function, namely a classical utilitarian one, and 
derived optimal emission reduction pathways for different regions. 
The results show that the two cases have dramatically different emission reductions 
targets per region, but at the same time the overall global optimal emission path is 
affected a lot less by these considerations. In particular, taking account of equity 
between regions as I did in this paper does not change the optimal global emission path 
in a dramatic way from the emission path that is calculated when only taking efficiency 
into consideration. 
At the same time the approach in this paper has severe limitations. First, it only takes 
two extremes into account: Either all transfers between regions are ruled out or they are 
assumed to have no limits as pure lump sum transfers. These two choices clearly 
constitute the boundaries of the problem, in reality one can imagine much more nuanced 
frameworks, with partial compensation payments between regions, payments that are 
not lossless and transfers only between specific regions. 
Secondly, I base the analysis of the situation without transfers on a utilitarian welfare 
function, without any philosophical justification for it. There is no good reason for this 
other than this is common practise in most of the literature on the economics of climate 
change. Once one leaves the world of pure efficiency, the question of which ethical 
framework to pick becomes of high importance. In this paper I do not argue that the 
specific utilitarian welfare function I used is the appropriate one, I only show that under 
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that specific choice distributional questions are of significant importance to the optimal 
marginal abatement costs. 
Finally, this paper ignores any problems of incentives of different regions, i.e. the game 
theoretic problem of reaching an actual agreement to mitigate climate change emissions 
is ignored. At the same time I see a contribution of this paper to that literature: in any 
attempt to come up with some global agreement that circumvents the free-riding 
problem associated with a global public bad like climate change there is a need for a 
benchmark optimal solution. What is the optimum that should be achieved by a 
achieved by an international agreement? This is principally a normative question, and I 
hope this paper demonstrates that purely looking at an efficient outcome might not do 
the magnitude of the distributional problem justice. 
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Figure 17: Optimal tax per tC in the year 2005 for prtp=1% and η=1 
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Figure 18: Optimal tax per tC for selected regions in the year 2050 and 2100 for 




























Figure 19: Reduction in emissions compared to business as usual scenario in the year 














Business as usual warming: 3.17 
   
Utility 
calibration 
No transfers Transfers 
η=1   
prtp=0.1% 2.41 2.34 
prtp=1.0% 2.92 2.91 
prtp=3.0% 3.12 3.12 
η=1.5   
prtp=0.1% 2.65 2.75 
prtp=1.0% 2.96 3.03 
prtp=3.0% 3.13 3.13 
η=2   
prtp=0.1% 2.69 2.98 
prtp=1.0% 2.95 3.09 
prtp=3.0% 3.13 3.14 
Table 18: Temperature increase above pre-industrial in °C in the year 2100 for no 
policy intervention (business as usual) and optimal policies for different calibrations of 
the utility function 
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Overall Conclusion and Outlook 
In chapter 1 we define various balanced growth equivalences, and apply them to 
compute the total impacts of climate change and the benefits of emission reduction with 
the integrated assessment model FUND. We thus replicate the core of the Stern Review 
analysis, conduct a wider sensitivity analysis than run by the Stern Review, clarify 
analytically the concept of balanced growth equivalence when applied to climate change 
and produce an up to date estimate of total impacts of climate change. We find that the 
impacts of climate change are sensitive to the pure rate of time preference, the rate of 
risk aversion and inequality aversion, the level of spatial disaggregation, the inclusion 
of uncertainty, and the socio-economic scenario. Compared to the Stern Review, our 
results span a wider range in both directions, thereby questioning the claim that the high 
impact estimates obtained by the Stern Review are robust. We find that the guess of the 
Stern Review that a regional welfare function might increase overall damage estimates 
by a quarter (Stern, 2007, p. 187) is very conservative. In our runs, the introduction of a 
regional welfare function, in particular in combination with a high risk aversion, has a 
much larger effect on the results. Finally, we show that the Stern Review was wrong to 
equate the impact of climate change and the benefits of emission reduction – their 
“optimal” climate policy does not maximise welfare in the mathematical sense of the 
word. Qualitatively, this was known. Quantitatively, we show that this is a big mistake. 
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The results in chapter 1 also highlight areas that need more research work. This includes 
improved socio-economic and climate scenarios, and better and more complete 
estimates of the impacts of climate change. In particular, disentangling intertemporal 
substitution from risk aversion and inequality aversion is a high priority (e.g., Carlsson 
et al., 2005). With only one parameter to control three important effects, as commonly 
used in climate policy analysis, model- and scenario-specific ambiguities emerge. The 
fat tails that showed up in some of our results with high risk aversion and a regional 
welfare function are another area for further research. 
The results in chapter 3 continue the investigation of some of the themes that emerged 
as important in chapter 1, but this time with an emphasis on estimates of marginal 
damages, i.e. the social cost of carbon. We conduct a systematic sensitivity analysis 
with respect to risk aversion and the pure rate of time preference that spans the whole 
range of values discussed in the literature. Stern (2007) tried to argue philosophically 
for specific choices of discount rates and risk aversion parameters, which is one way to 
narrow down the broad range of results we find in our sensitivity analysis with respect 
to both parameters. We bypass that debate in this chapter by exploring the ramifications 
of actual decision makers and actual developed economies. We find that aversion to risk 
is as important in determining SCC estimates as time preference. We find high 
estimates for the SCC given operational combinations of risk aversion and time 
preference even with a model that incorporates relatively conservative damage estimates 
(including benefits early on) and autonomous adaptation driven by regional economic 
development. 
Chapter 2 looks at a specific impact category. The analysis in that chapter suggests that 
if sea-level rise was up to 2m per century, while the costs of sea-level rise increase due 
to greater damage and protection costs, an optimum response in a benefit-cost sense 
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remains widespread protection of developed coastal areas. We also show that the 
benefits of protection increase significantly with time due to the economic growth 
assumed in the SRES socio-economic scenarios. Due to the different assumptions about 
population and gross domestic product, the socio-economic scenarios are also important 
drivers of these costs. In terms of the four components of costs considered in FUND, 
protection dominates, with substantial costs from wetland loss under some scenarios. 
The regional distribution of costs shows a few regions experience most of the costs, 
especially South Asia, South America, North America, Europe, East Asia and Central 
America. Under a scenario of no protection, the costs of sea-level rise increase greatly 
due to land loss and population displacement: this scenario shows the significant 
benefits of the protection response in reducing the overall costs of sea-level rise. 
The equity-weighted results highlight how important it is to not only consider the 
absolute magnitude of damage but also who will be affected. The welfare loss of even 
small damages to poor societies can be enormous. There is no consensus within the 
economic literature that equity-weighted damages ought to be used when policy 
instruments like Pigouvian taxes are designed, and hence the results presented here 
should not be used for policy design without further investigation. But there is little 
doubt that as a measure of actual welfare loss, equity-weighted results are much more 
accurate than pure monetary damage estimates. The question of what to do about the 
discrepancy in severity of impacts to poor and rich people is an ethical one. In 
calculating damage estimates, though, these differences should be made explicit to not 
under- or overstate the true welfare loss that climate change might cause, as we have 
done with the equity-weighted results in this chapter. 
In chapter 4 we continue our exploration of marginal damage estimates. Climate change 
is a global problem, but decisions are made by national decision makers. In previous 
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papers, researchers have discussed the appropriate carbon tax for a global decision 
maker. In chapter 4, we discuss the appropriate carbon tax for a national decision 
maker. We distinguish between four different cases. First, the national decision maker 
does not care about what happens abroad. Second, the national decision maker is 
altruistic towards foreigners. Third, the national decision maker compensates damages 
done abroad. Fourth, the national decision makers feels responsible for damages done 
abroad, but cannot compensate. Carbon taxes are lowest in the first case (sovereignty). 
They are highest in the fourth case (good neighbour) for the richest regions, and in the 
third case (compensation) for the poorest regions. Middle income regions may face the 
highest carbon taxes under international cooperation. This order is robust to the choice 
of the pure rate of time preference and the inequality aversion, but carbon taxes are 
higher if the pure rate of time preference is lower, and carbon taxes tend to be higher if 
the inequality aversion is higher. 
Further research in this field would certainly be welcome. The analysis here should be 
reproduced with other integrated assessment models. A wider range of utility and 
welfare functions should be explored, and the link between the utility function and the 
willingness to pay for climate change impacts should be investigated. The interactions 
between risk and inequity aversion should be added. The resolution of the model should 
be refined, and further interactions between actors should be modeled. And of course, 
the implications of our research for greenhouse gas emission reductions, both in a 
cooperative and a non-cooperative setting, need to be investigated. 
In the final chapter, I contrast a first-best world in which an optimal emissions path is 
calculated purely based on an efficiency criterion, i.e. under the assumption that any 
distributional consequences of a specific policy can be dealt with at a later stage with 
different (and costless) instruments, with a look at a specific ethical framework and a 
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global decision maker who is constrained in his policy options. In particular, I assumed 
in a second step that a global decision maker has the ability to set mitigation paths for 
all regions, but does not have any instruments at hand to compensate for unwanted 
distributional disturbances caused by the emission control policy. In this second 
scenario I looked at a specific welfare function, namely a classical utilitarian one, and 
derived optimal emission reduction pathways for different regions. 
The results show that the two cases have dramatically different emission reductions 
targets per region, but at the same time the overall global optimal emission path is 
affected a lot less by these considerations. In particular, taking account of equity 
between regions as I did in this paper does not change the optimal global emission path 
in a dramatic way from the emission path that is calculated when only taking efficiency 
into consideration. 
At the same time the approach in this chapter has severe limitations. First, it only takes 
two extremes into account: Either all transfers between regions are ruled out or they are 
assumed to have no limits as pure lump sum transfers. These two choices clearly 
constitute the boundaries of the problem. In reality one can imagine much more nuanced 
frameworks, with partial compensation payments between regions, payments that are 
not lossless and transfers only between specific regions. 
Secondly, I base the analysis of the situation without transfers on a utilitarian welfare 
function, without any philosophical justification for it. There is no good reason for this 
other than this is common practice in most of the literature on the economics of climate 
change. Once one leaves the world of pure efficiency, the question of which ethical 
framework to pick becomes crucial. In this chapter I do not argue that the specific 
utilitarian welfare function I used is the appropriate one, I only show that under that 
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specific choice, distributional questions are of significant importance to the optimal 
marginal abatement costs. 
Finally, this chapter ignores any problems of incentives of different regions, i.e., the 
game theoretic problem of reaching an actual agreement to mitigate climate change 
emissions is ignored. At the same time I see a contribution of this paper to that 
literature: in any attempt to come up with some global agreement that circumvents the 
free-riding problem associated with a global public bad like climate change there is a 
need for a benchmark optimal solution. What is the optimum that should be achieved by 
an international agreement? This is primarily a normative question, and I hope this 
paper demonstrates that purely looking at an efficient outcome might not do justice to 
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